You are returning to your hospital at 3:30 in the morning, with a crew and critical patient on board. As the patient's condition deteriorates, so does the weather around you. Although your forecast was for good weather, it was wrong.
You consider your options...
You can descend and slow down, and try to "scud run" into the hospital - but you know from NEMSPA's Enroute Decision Point efforts that this option often ends badly. You can turn around and go back to the referring hospital (maybe) , or divert to another hospital or airport, or you can land right there...
Or maybe, in the near future you will have another option. Maybe you will be able to contact ATC and get clearance to complete the flight under instrument flight rules in your IFR equipped single-engine helicopter...
You can read an industry white paper on this topic by clicking here.
An excerpt...
"The Associations’ position is that it is natural for the Part 27 single-engine rotorcraft community
to want to have IFR capability and be IFR current – if it is affordable. Most helicopter
operations are commercial, and being limited by weather prevents the rotorcraft from being
consistently employed. Contracted services currently pressure operators into “pushing” the
weather situation. The situation is especially difficult for EMS and public operations where it is
known lives are in the balance with the weather decision. The Associations feel it is the FAA’s
duty to the rotorcraft industry to provide a practical option for IFR conditions other than “don’t fly” – especially when that practical option previously existed. Once Part 27 single-engine IFR
becomes viable, it will be demanded by hospital organizations as a condition of EMS contracts -
much in the way IFR capability is a demanded today for twin engine rotorcraft in EMS. The
safety, liability concerns, and expanded usability will produce the demand."
Thanks Rex Alexander for pointing this out to us...
News, safety related information, and personal experiences concerning taking care by air. All rights reserved.
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Friday, August 14, 2015
Wednesday, August 12, 2015
AMRM Training.... Man (Woman) versus Machine
An instructor conducting AMRM training seeks to have a picture painted. But for a class to be really good, the people in the room must do the painting.
I was corresponding with my friend Randy Mains recently about AMRM training. Air Medical Resource Management has it's roots in studies conducted in the 1950s on group dynamics. The airlines adopted Cockpit Resource Management training after some horrific events that killed hundreds. In time, they recognized that the entire flight crew has a part in what happens on an aircraft, and the name, and focus, were changed to "Crew" resource management. Randy and I adhere to the idea that everyone in our organizations, from com-specs to security guards to flight crews to the CEO...Everyone affects the outcome.
I think the world of Randy and enjoy our talks and messages back and forth. Randy conducts week-long training sessions for aspiring AMRM instructors, to prepare them to go out into the HEMS world and spread the gospel of staying alive by working together.
Ninety percent of every dollar we spend on training goes towards technical proficiency. Ninety percent of our crashes have nothing to do with technical proficiency. They involve what is going on between someone's ears as a bad situation develops. A dime spent on AMRM training is a dollar well spent... Even without the FAR requirement, even without the CAMTS requirement, it's the right thing to do for your people.
Randy and I and others believe that AMRM training should take place in a group environment - in person - facilitated by someone not part of the immediate-organization. This precludes preconceptions about who is good or bad, smart or dumb...
An instructor conducting AMRM training seeks to have a picture painted. But for a class to be really good, the people in the room must do the painting. The instructor's job is to take a screwdriver and pry the lid off the paint can. Sometimes the lid pops right off - at a program that has just suffered a fatal crash for instance... Other times, we have to patiently work our way around the edges; pry here, pry there, tell a story that resonates with a student and off comes the lid...
As fellow AMRM instructor Jonathon Godfrey pointed out, you can't tell people how to think and feel about things. They draw their own conclusions based upon what they experience. The student's own experiences are key to this effort - this shaping of good attitudes that lead to good behaviors, good decisions, good outcomes.
I was instructing in Charlotte a couple of months ago. In the middle of a story about something bad that happened to someone, a young woman - very new to the program - held her hand up and asked to tell me a story about a flight she had been on. A "remarkable" flight...
My inner voice said, "shut up Dan and sit down..
The can popped open.
You see, your program's near-miss, accident, event etc... discussed openly and honestly - without fear of ridicule, embarrassment, or adverse action - will resonate more effectively with your team than any story about some stranger who made a mistake. I let you teach me about your event. What it means. How it happened. How we learn from it, and never repeat it... Most of my material comes to me from the people sitting in my classes. As I tell my friends in class, "the person who will prevent your next fatal crash is sitting in your seat right now..."
This training is about humans, (we make mistakes) and it doesn't work when it's conducted by computers... I urge you to have AMRM training for your team using a group setting and a dedicated instructor.
Tuesday, August 11, 2015
Using all the resources available to prevent a mistake...
Complacency means we don't use every resource available to ensure situational awareness...
I almost embarrassed myself last Sunday.
We were flying a crash victim from rural Alabama to Birmingham, a place I have been to before. In years gone by I have flown out of Birmingham's old Caraway hospital, and have been up to Birmingham from Auburn and down to Birmingham from Huntsville.
So I wasn't too concerned about flying into Birmingham. I could have used Google Earth on my smartphone to look at the lay of the land before departing the pickup location, when spare time was abundant. I could have found some visual checkpoints to make sure that I knew exactly where we were to land. But no.
So as we approached the University of Birmingham's sprawling campus with multiple tall buildings from the east, a new way in. I set about finding this helipad that I had flown to before, with eyeballs darting to and fro.
My eyes quickly locked onto a beautiful red and white rooftop pad. A part of my brain said, "got you!" So I said, "okay, I see a pad."
Then I did something right (even a blind squirrel gets a nut once in a while).
I asked the crew - Steve and Rebecca - for assistance and confirmation. After all, crews at bases are much more familiar with the area of operations than a relief pilot who shows up once in a blue moon.
Rebecca said, "the pad is right over here at your three o'clock." I wasn't looking that way. But the pad I was looking at was so pretty, and it was right there for the taking... Then, an un-dumb question,
"okay, is there more than one helipad here?"
"Yes, there are three" she said.
I said, "are we looking for that other one on the big mirrored building?"
Rebecca said, "no, that's the children's hospital, ours is over to the right more."
Finally - I looked where she had been prompting, letting go of the wrong pad that my eyes liked so much. And there was my old friend - the UAB pad - looking just like it had a couple of years back...
We landed without incident, at the right place.
Thanks to the assistance provided by a flight crew...
I almost embarrassed myself last Sunday.
We were flying a crash victim from rural Alabama to Birmingham, a place I have been to before. In years gone by I have flown out of Birmingham's old Caraway hospital, and have been up to Birmingham from Auburn and down to Birmingham from Huntsville.
So I wasn't too concerned about flying into Birmingham. I could have used Google Earth on my smartphone to look at the lay of the land before departing the pickup location, when spare time was abundant. I could have found some visual checkpoints to make sure that I knew exactly where we were to land. But no.
So as we approached the University of Birmingham's sprawling campus with multiple tall buildings from the east, a new way in. I set about finding this helipad that I had flown to before, with eyeballs darting to and fro.
My eyes quickly locked onto a beautiful red and white rooftop pad. A part of my brain said, "got you!" So I said, "okay, I see a pad."
Then I did something right (even a blind squirrel gets a nut once in a while).
I asked the crew - Steve and Rebecca - for assistance and confirmation. After all, crews at bases are much more familiar with the area of operations than a relief pilot who shows up once in a blue moon.
Rebecca said, "the pad is right over here at your three o'clock." I wasn't looking that way. But the pad I was looking at was so pretty, and it was right there for the taking... Then, an un-dumb question,
"okay, is there more than one helipad here?"
"Yes, there are three" she said.
I said, "are we looking for that other one on the big mirrored building?"
Rebecca said, "no, that's the children's hospital, ours is over to the right more."
Finally - I looked where she had been prompting, letting go of the wrong pad that my eyes liked so much. And there was my old friend - the UAB pad - looking just like it had a couple of years back...
We landed without incident, at the right place.
Thanks to the assistance provided by a flight crew...
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| Click image to enlarge. UAB pad is top center. |
Saturday, August 8, 2015
Knowledge of emergency procedures and aircraft limitations...A non-negotiable requirement for any pilot...
NTSB Identification: ERA13LA421
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Thursday, September 19, 2013 in Canton, MS
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/04/2015
Aircraft: AMERICAN EUROCOPTER LLC AS350B2, registration: N810LE
Injuries: 1 Serious, 3 Minor.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
As the helicopter departed the helipad, a witness saw dark black smoke coming out of the engine exhaust. (This smoke would not have been visible to the pilot.)
(Sidebar: Does your AMRM training include everyone involved in your operations? Would a hospital security guard know what to do, who to call, what to say if she saw something wrong with your aircraft as you were leaving her hospital's helipad? )
The pilot reported that, about 10 minutes after departure, he noticed the illumination of the low engine oil pressure warning light. He noted that the oil pressure gauge was also showing low pressure but that there was no rise in the oil temperature or the exhaust gas temperature. Because the pilot had recently experienced an intermittent oil pressure gauge problem in another helicopter, he assumed the accident helicopter was experiencing a similar problem and continued toward the intended destination while attempting to verify the loss of engine oil pressure. Several minutes later, the pilot noticed a low-torque indication but no rise in the oil temperature or exhaust gas temperature. About 25 minutes after departure, the pilot saw a rise in the exhaust gas temperature and lowered the collective to reduce power. After briefly decreasing, the exhaust gas temperature began rising again, and the pilot located an open field to perform an off-airport landing. The engine experienced a total loss of power before the helicopter reached the open field; the pilot performed an autorotation, and the helicopter landed hard.
Postaccident examination revealed that the engine oil tank was empty and that the engine had sustained heat damage consistent with overtemperature due to oil exhaustion. An obstruction of solidified oil carbon was found in the rear bearing chip detector housing union, which would have restricted the oil scavenge of the rear bearing. According to the engine manufacturer, failure to scavenge the oil in the rear bearing would cause overpressurization of the rear bearing housing area, which would force engine oil out of the rear bearing vent line. In addition, oil overpressurization could overcome the labyrinth seal of the piston shaft, which would allow oil to flow into the gas exhaust path. It is likely that this occurred because oil flowing into the exhaust path would result in black smoke coming from the engine exhaust as was observed by the witness. The continued operation of the engine in this condition likely resulted in the depletion of the oil reservoir, the illumination of the low engine oil pressure warning light, and, subsequently, as the flight continued, a total loss of engine power.
A review of data recovered from a flight recorder installed in the helicopter indicated that, about 2 minutes after departure (about 26 minutes before the accident), the oil pressure dropped from about 4 bars to about 0.2 bar, which would have illuminated the low engine oil pressure warning light. The flight manual and the cockpit emergency checklist both directed that, when the low engine oil pressure warning light was illuminated and the engine oil pressure gauge indicated low oil pressure (as reported by the pilot), the procedure was to land immediately. If the pilot had followed this procedure instead of continuing the flight with the warning light illuminated, it is likely that the accident would have been prevented. Review of the helicopter’s maintenance records indicated that, about 12 flight hours before the accident flight, the engine’s 2nd-stage turbine disk (T2) was replaced. During the replacement of the T2, the maintenance technician determined that the rear bearing was “clean”; therefore, he did not clean the rear bearing even though the maintenance procedures required a systematic cleaning when the T2 was replaced regardless of the condition of the bearing. If the cleaning had been performed, as called for in the maintenance procedures, it is likely that the oil carbon deposit in the rear bearing chip detector housing union would have been discovered and removed, thus averting the accident.
(Sidebar: Does your AMRM training include everyone involved in your operations? Would a hospital security guard know what to do, who to call, what to say if she saw something wrong with your aircraft as you were leaving her hospital's helipad? )
The pilot reported that, about 10 minutes after departure, he noticed the illumination of the low engine oil pressure warning light. He noted that the oil pressure gauge was also showing low pressure but that there was no rise in the oil temperature or the exhaust gas temperature. Because the pilot had recently experienced an intermittent oil pressure gauge problem in another helicopter, he assumed the accident helicopter was experiencing a similar problem and continued toward the intended destination while attempting to verify the loss of engine oil pressure. Several minutes later, the pilot noticed a low-torque indication but no rise in the oil temperature or exhaust gas temperature. About 25 minutes after departure, the pilot saw a rise in the exhaust gas temperature and lowered the collective to reduce power. After briefly decreasing, the exhaust gas temperature began rising again, and the pilot located an open field to perform an off-airport landing. The engine experienced a total loss of power before the helicopter reached the open field; the pilot performed an autorotation, and the helicopter landed hard.
Postaccident examination revealed that the engine oil tank was empty and that the engine had sustained heat damage consistent with overtemperature due to oil exhaustion. An obstruction of solidified oil carbon was found in the rear bearing chip detector housing union, which would have restricted the oil scavenge of the rear bearing. According to the engine manufacturer, failure to scavenge the oil in the rear bearing would cause overpressurization of the rear bearing housing area, which would force engine oil out of the rear bearing vent line. In addition, oil overpressurization could overcome the labyrinth seal of the piston shaft, which would allow oil to flow into the gas exhaust path. It is likely that this occurred because oil flowing into the exhaust path would result in black smoke coming from the engine exhaust as was observed by the witness. The continued operation of the engine in this condition likely resulted in the depletion of the oil reservoir, the illumination of the low engine oil pressure warning light, and, subsequently, as the flight continued, a total loss of engine power.
A review of data recovered from a flight recorder installed in the helicopter indicated that, about 2 minutes after departure (about 26 minutes before the accident), the oil pressure dropped from about 4 bars to about 0.2 bar, which would have illuminated the low engine oil pressure warning light. The flight manual and the cockpit emergency checklist both directed that, when the low engine oil pressure warning light was illuminated and the engine oil pressure gauge indicated low oil pressure (as reported by the pilot), the procedure was to land immediately. If the pilot had followed this procedure instead of continuing the flight with the warning light illuminated, it is likely that the accident would have been prevented. Review of the helicopter’s maintenance records indicated that, about 12 flight hours before the accident flight, the engine’s 2nd-stage turbine disk (T2) was replaced. During the replacement of the T2, the maintenance technician determined that the rear bearing was “clean”; therefore, he did not clean the rear bearing even though the maintenance procedures required a systematic cleaning when the T2 was replaced regardless of the condition of the bearing. If the cleaning had been performed, as called for in the maintenance procedures, it is likely that the oil carbon deposit in the rear bearing chip detector housing union would have been discovered and removed, thus averting the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
- The pilot’s improper decision to continue flight with a low engine oil pressure warning light instead of landing immediately in accordance with the flight manual emergency checklist. Contributing to the accident was the maintenance technician’s failure to clean the rear bearing in accordance with the engine manufacturer’s guidance when replacing the 2nd-stage turbine wheel, which resulted in an obstruction of solidified oil carbon in the rear bearing chip detector housing union, subsequent oil exhaustion, and engine failure.
Reassembly complete...Now what about these extra parts?
On November 9, 2013, about 1245 central standard time, a Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC135P1 helicopter, N911KB, impacted terrain near Shreveport, Louisiana. The commercial pilot and two company mechanics sustained minor injuries and the helicopter was substantially damaged.
A review of the helicopter's log book found an entry dated October 31, 2013, that a mechanic performed the action "disassemble, inspect, and reassemble tail rotor pedals". According to a statement provided by the company's director of maintenance, after the accident a search of the area maintenance area was conducted. Near the area where the helicopter was previously repaired, a small parts bag was found tied to the tail rotor control cable that had been replaced. Inside of the bag were bolts similar to the bolts used to secure the anti-torque pedals.
Complacency can bite any of us on any given day. Consider your strategy to break error chains. "second set of eyeballs," CYA checks, tool and parts inventory post-maintenance... Are there chinks in your armor?
Tuesday, August 4, 2015
More Helo Porn....
Okay, we get the fenestron... increased safety.
Now imagine a BK - Airbus 145 T3 with a Starflex rotor system vice the rigid "vomit comet" rotor... Both bullet-proof reliable, but one is much smoother in turbulence. If we can have fantasy sports leagues why not fantasy helicopters...
Now imagine a BK - Airbus 145 T3 with a Starflex rotor system vice the rigid "vomit comet" rotor... Both bullet-proof reliable, but one is much smoother in turbulence. If we can have fantasy sports leagues why not fantasy helicopters...
HEMS Flight Simulator for Medical Crew Training : Case Western Reserve University
Using the nation’s first full-motion simulator built in an actual helicopter specifically for a flight-nursing program, our students learn what it's like to provide critical care in the air—while staying on the ground. Learn more at http://flightnurse.case.edu/.
Posted by Case Western Reserve University on Tuesday, May 5, 2015
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