News, safety related information, and personal experiences concerning taking care by air. All rights reserved.
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Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Sunday, December 14, 2014
The Details Matter...Even When We Are Tired
I had the pleasure of speaking with the Director of Flight Operation of a very large EMS helicopter company. We were discussing crashes. I mentioned that I had read a pilot's report to the NTSB stating that he had felt like his approach was fast and steep, as might occur if one was landing with the wind or "downwind" prior to initiating a go-around. As the pilot applied power to climb and accelerate, the aircraft began an uncommanded yaw that turned into several rotations in the yaw axis, loss of control, and a crash. People were killed.
The D.O. stated that this has happened more than once. Pilot's preparing to land at 2:00 am don't perform as well as they might at 10:00 am, and this is made apparent by studying HEMS crashes and hospital security-camera feeds.
All pilots know that they should go through a deliberate set of steps prior to landing. A before-landing-check should be verbalized, a statement of the planned path in (and out) should be made with an announcement of any hazards observed. If you only have one motor, the forced landing location(s) should be announced so that you and all others on board know where you are going when the engine quits.
Sidebar: If your pilot has not announced a visible hazard, like a tower or wires or a vehicle - she might not see it. You must announce it.
And - very importantly - the pilot should announce his or her opinion of where the wind is coming from and how it might affect the helicopter. Often when we land there is no wind sock on scene. So we must determine the wind direction and velocity through other means. If I state where I think the wind is coming from, and you disagree, now is the time to speak up.
Unfortunately for us, when we are out in the wee hours, we don't perform as well as we do during the day when fresh and rested. It's a proven fact. Read the NTSB reports. Our mood, performance, and judgement are degraded.
And that's why we tend to crash more in the middle of the night. When tired we just do the minimum to get by; to get the aircraft, crew and patient to the destination.
We can miss the details.
For this reason, at night is when established procedures, protocols, checklists and company best-practices must be adhered to. Like performing a high recon, like knowing where the wind is from, Like getting the aircraft slowed down per company policy. Like flying the correct angle.
Note that if I am falling short on any of these items, the only persons who can point this out to me are you two or three crew members flying with me. There is no second pilot to catch my mistake.This means you have to know how things are supposed to look and feel, and speak up if something is off. I am a damned good pilot. And I haven't crashed.
Yet.
This makes me just like your pilot.
As a human being, I am subject to make a mistake, like a guy in Texas did. He initiated a go-around, aborting his approach because it didn't feel right. And it led to a crash. In another event - on video - another guy did the same exact thing and got into the yawing spin. That helicopter went around about 45 times, yes forty-five times, before the pilot initiated a climb in desperation. He got some altitude , reduced power, and let the helicopter fall off to one side. The aircraft weather-vaned, stopped spinning, and he was able to fly out of it.
"Well pardon the crap in my pants..."
So, perhaps we should focus on getting it right the first time in - especially at night. Some aircraft are more susceptible to loss of tail-rotor effectiveness than others, but they are all subject to vortex-ring state, and hitting things. In any helicopter, a small decrease in rotor RPM - such as might occur during a massive power increase when aborting an approach and starting a climb - will equate to a much greater loss of tail-rotor/fan RPM and authority. In a BK the ratio is 8 to 1 TR to MR. And when that tail rotor stops being effective we will push more pedal until it either is effective or it stalls.
Note: In the first event referred to here, the pilot reported that he did NOT apply FULL pedal against the yawing spin. We should be ready to apply full pedal to control the aircraft. This has never happened to me, but experts say full pedal will arrest the yawing motion. Both pilots reported that "the cyclic stopped working." This led the DO to surmise that the aircraft, when spinning rapidly - on the order of 360 degrees per second - can get out of sync/phase with cyclic inputs. If the nose is down, and the pilot inputs aft cyclic, the delay in cyclic effect means that the aircraft has spun to the point that the input is reversed. This is something to consider, and more reason to avoid letting the yaw get away from us. Apply full pedal against yaw as required...
Crews can assist with determining wind direction. Look fo flags in the wind, smoke from stacks, groundspeed versus airspeed comparisons, and wind correction headings inbound to the destination. All these serve to tell us the wind direction and speed. Wind can change near the ground, and we have to be ready for this, and ready to call a go-around.
The D.O. stated that this has happened more than once. Pilot's preparing to land at 2:00 am don't perform as well as they might at 10:00 am, and this is made apparent by studying HEMS crashes and hospital security-camera feeds.
All pilots know that they should go through a deliberate set of steps prior to landing. A before-landing-check should be verbalized, a statement of the planned path in (and out) should be made with an announcement of any hazards observed. If you only have one motor, the forced landing location(s) should be announced so that you and all others on board know where you are going when the engine quits.
Sidebar: If your pilot has not announced a visible hazard, like a tower or wires or a vehicle - she might not see it. You must announce it.
And - very importantly - the pilot should announce his or her opinion of where the wind is coming from and how it might affect the helicopter. Often when we land there is no wind sock on scene. So we must determine the wind direction and velocity through other means. If I state where I think the wind is coming from, and you disagree, now is the time to speak up.
Unfortunately for us, when we are out in the wee hours, we don't perform as well as we do during the day when fresh and rested. It's a proven fact. Read the NTSB reports. Our mood, performance, and judgement are degraded.
And that's why we tend to crash more in the middle of the night. When tired we just do the minimum to get by; to get the aircraft, crew and patient to the destination.
We can miss the details.
![]() |
| If we are landing, and you see smoke from a stack flowing in the same direction we are flying, call a go-around. Landing downwind leads to vortex-ring-state and loss of tail-rotor effectiveness |
For this reason, at night is when established procedures, protocols, checklists and company best-practices must be adhered to. Like performing a high recon, like knowing where the wind is from, Like getting the aircraft slowed down per company policy. Like flying the correct angle.
Note that if I am falling short on any of these items, the only persons who can point this out to me are you two or three crew members flying with me. There is no second pilot to catch my mistake.This means you have to know how things are supposed to look and feel, and speak up if something is off. I am a damned good pilot. And I haven't crashed.
Yet.
This makes me just like your pilot.
As a human being, I am subject to make a mistake, like a guy in Texas did. He initiated a go-around, aborting his approach because it didn't feel right. And it led to a crash. In another event - on video - another guy did the same exact thing and got into the yawing spin. That helicopter went around about 45 times, yes forty-five times, before the pilot initiated a climb in desperation. He got some altitude , reduced power, and let the helicopter fall off to one side. The aircraft weather-vaned, stopped spinning, and he was able to fly out of it.
"Well pardon the crap in my pants..."
So, perhaps we should focus on getting it right the first time in - especially at night. Some aircraft are more susceptible to loss of tail-rotor effectiveness than others, but they are all subject to vortex-ring state, and hitting things. In any helicopter, a small decrease in rotor RPM - such as might occur during a massive power increase when aborting an approach and starting a climb - will equate to a much greater loss of tail-rotor/fan RPM and authority. In a BK the ratio is 8 to 1 TR to MR. And when that tail rotor stops being effective we will push more pedal until it either is effective or it stalls.
Note: In the first event referred to here, the pilot reported that he did NOT apply FULL pedal against the yawing spin. We should be ready to apply full pedal to control the aircraft. This has never happened to me, but experts say full pedal will arrest the yawing motion. Both pilots reported that "the cyclic stopped working." This led the DO to surmise that the aircraft, when spinning rapidly - on the order of 360 degrees per second - can get out of sync/phase with cyclic inputs. If the nose is down, and the pilot inputs aft cyclic, the delay in cyclic effect means that the aircraft has spun to the point that the input is reversed. This is something to consider, and more reason to avoid letting the yaw get away from us. Apply full pedal against yaw as required...
Crews can assist with determining wind direction. Look fo flags in the wind, smoke from stacks, groundspeed versus airspeed comparisons, and wind correction headings inbound to the destination. All these serve to tell us the wind direction and speed. Wind can change near the ground, and we have to be ready for this, and ready to call a go-around.
Wednesday, December 10, 2014
Newest Cool Device : X-Stat Dressing (from the Trauma Professional's Blog)
You land at a scene for a shooting victim. You load him into your aircraft and a stream of blood sprays up and over the patient/pilot barrier and lands in a spotted pattern on the pilot's knee-board. He exclaims.
Gauze and pressure aren't stemming the flow, and you have a long flight back to a trauma center.
Perhaps this product would help...
We were pointed to this by Dr. McGonigal on his blog. Click here.
Read more at a PopSci article here...
Thursday, December 4, 2014
Some Thoughts for Today. What is The Role of Culture?
Air Medical Resource Management Operates at the Intersection of Psychology (what's going on between my ears) and Culture (what's going on in my organization) ... William T. Winn
By Dan Foulds
I am going through my AMRM presentation slides today, making some changes and preparing for classes next Monday and Tuesday. I decided this was worth sharing and hope you agree. If you have any thoughts let's hear 'em. And "war stories?" We love stories.
As a medical crewmember, communications specialist, mechanic, or member of hospital security, at times we hesitate to speak up, to ask a question. We don't want to appear dumb, we worry about appearing to lack trust. We worry about being perceived as a trouble-maker and perhaps losing our job.
As pilot, we may hesitate to speak up for fear of showing weakness.
This hesitation is especially prevalent in new crew-members. The nurse who died in a crash in Newberry SC was new. The nurse who died in Georgetown SC was new.
You don't get to be new here. You must ask and learn NOW.
Ridicule, intimidation, and sarcasm have no business in this business. Culture begins with senior leadership and ends with you.
The National EMS Pilot's Association has prepared a great cultural health assessment tool, CHAMPS. It only costs $500 to find out what your cultural "pulse and pressure" are, and you can compare your organization to others ( no identifying information is shared). You can also compare one part of your program to another part. Visit NEMSPA to learn more.
Corporate Culture: A Case of Monkey See, Monkey Do?
Written by Fred Nickols
Did you ever wonder how your company's culture – that set of beliefs, traditions, and behavioral norms that determines "the way things work around here" – came to be? Or why, when you try to change it, it seems so resistant? Well, here's a little story about a scientific experiment that shows how culture comes into being and why it is so resistant.
The experimenters began with a cage, a set of externally enforced boundaries. Inside the cage, they hung a banana on a string and placed a set of stairs under it. They then introduced five monkeys into the cage. Before long, one of the monkeys started to climb the stairs toward the banana. As soon as it touched the stairs the experimenters sprayed all the other monkeys with really cold water. When another monkey made an attempt to get the banana they again sprayed the other monkeys with cold water. After a while the monkeys prevented any of their group from going after the banana.
After the cultural prohibition against "going for the banana" had been established the experimenters put away the cold water. They took one of the original monkeys out of the cage and introduced a new one. Upon spotting the banana the new monkey went after it. To its surprise and dismay all of the other monkeys attacked it. After another attempt and attack the new monkey learned that if it tried to climb the stairs and get the banana it would be assaulted and so it stopped going after the banana. It had been acculturated, assimilated into the cage's "don't go for the banana" culture.
Next the experimenters removed another of the original five monkeys and replaced it with another new one. The second new monkey went to the stairs and predictably it was attacked. The first new monkey took part in this punishment with enthusiasm! Similarly a third original monkey was replaced with a new one, then a fourth, then the fifth.
Every time the newest monkey took to the stairs it was attacked by the other monkeys. Most of the monkeys that were beating it had no idea why they were not permitted to climb the stairs or why they were participating in the beating of the newest monkey. After all the original monkeys were replaced none of the remaining monkeys had ever been sprayed with cold water. Nevertheless, no monkey ever approached the stairs to try for the banana. Why not? Because as far as they knew: "That's the way it's always been done around here."
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
Is The Scene Safe?
The flight nurse looked out the back windows of the aircraft in disbelief. They had landed on a two lane road at an accident scene - in front of the aircraft a horrific car crash was being sorted out - behind them, the road was open. It was chaotic, and emergency vehicles were still inbound. As she glanced behind them, she observed a large vehicle bearing down on her. Too fast, too close. She yelled.
With feet to spare, the truck veered off the road and came to a stop beside the aircraft. The truck's driver had been unable to determine distance to the obstacle to his front - a running helicopter - because of the dozens of flashing lights and apparatus surrounding the scene. He was responding to a crash with his own lights and siren going, and had some adrenaline on board. It almost ended like this... ( the action starts about 1:45 in)
If the video is not supported on your device you can access it here.
The film above makes a good case for not having trucks driving next to a running helicopter on scene. If a picture is worth a thousand words, a film should be worth a few million (dollars - what that aircraft cost) How sad and ironic is it that you can survive for years operating "a collection of parts - flying in close formation - all supplied by the lowest bidder," and get whacked by a truck on the ground.
The hazards of landing a helicopter at an accident scene are easily overlooked, especially after landing at a few hundred of them without incident. We take it for granted that everyone involved is trained, and knows what not to do - but every once in awhile this ends up not being the case.
I landed at a scene once in South Carolina. My crew asked me to stay running. As I watched them disappear into the back of the ambulance, the man they had designated as my "tail-rotor guard," wearing blue jeans with cigarette in hand, strolled up to my left front window and casually had a look at the cockpit. When asked to move away from the running helicopter, he stated that he knew what he needed to do.
Apparently not.
The situation is made more complex by the fact that we in HEMS depend on cordial relationships with first-responders for flight requests. If we don't get calls, we stop making house payments. We face competition in our service area, and we want them to call us, not the other program - so we walk a fine line between demanding a level of performance and accepting whatever-goes on scene. One thing you don't want to do is be the guy or gal who offends the volunteer-chief of the fire service setting up your scene; but you also don't want to kill a new probie - or have her kill you.
Clearly, the answer is communication and training. Someone from your flight program needs to visit every agency in your service area at least once a year to present a class on the good, bad, and ugly of scene operations. Someone needs to call and debrief each scene operation - what the military calls "after action review." If you are relegating this task to a business-development manager you are asking for trouble - they get paid to increase flight volume, not safety. Part of your training should be a review of actual accidents and incidents. There was a time when a director of operations I worked for didn't want us to speak about crashes with customers. As a person who has taught AMRM classes for several years and seen what works and what doesn't, there is nothing like a discussion of actual events - real people, real blood - to get someone's attention and buy-in for scene safety.
Click here for a story about the type of training that should be occurring everywhere.
Fly (and land) safely...
ase
With feet to spare, the truck veered off the road and came to a stop beside the aircraft. The truck's driver had been unable to determine distance to the obstacle to his front - a running helicopter - because of the dozens of flashing lights and apparatus surrounding the scene. He was responding to a crash with his own lights and siren going, and had some adrenaline on board. It almost ended like this... ( the action starts about 1:45 in)
If the video is not supported on your device you can access it here.
The film above makes a good case for not having trucks driving next to a running helicopter on scene. If a picture is worth a thousand words, a film should be worth a few million (dollars - what that aircraft cost) How sad and ironic is it that you can survive for years operating "a collection of parts - flying in close formation - all supplied by the lowest bidder," and get whacked by a truck on the ground.
The hazards of landing a helicopter at an accident scene are easily overlooked, especially after landing at a few hundred of them without incident. We take it for granted that everyone involved is trained, and knows what not to do - but every once in awhile this ends up not being the case.
I landed at a scene once in South Carolina. My crew asked me to stay running. As I watched them disappear into the back of the ambulance, the man they had designated as my "tail-rotor guard," wearing blue jeans with cigarette in hand, strolled up to my left front window and casually had a look at the cockpit. When asked to move away from the running helicopter, he stated that he knew what he needed to do.
Apparently not.
The situation is made more complex by the fact that we in HEMS depend on cordial relationships with first-responders for flight requests. If we don't get calls, we stop making house payments. We face competition in our service area, and we want them to call us, not the other program - so we walk a fine line between demanding a level of performance and accepting whatever-goes on scene. One thing you don't want to do is be the guy or gal who offends the volunteer-chief of the fire service setting up your scene; but you also don't want to kill a new probie - or have her kill you.
Clearly, the answer is communication and training. Someone from your flight program needs to visit every agency in your service area at least once a year to present a class on the good, bad, and ugly of scene operations. Someone needs to call and debrief each scene operation - what the military calls "after action review." If you are relegating this task to a business-development manager you are asking for trouble - they get paid to increase flight volume, not safety. Part of your training should be a review of actual accidents and incidents. There was a time when a director of operations I worked for didn't want us to speak about crashes with customers. As a person who has taught AMRM classes for several years and seen what works and what doesn't, there is nothing like a discussion of actual events - real people, real blood - to get someone's attention and buy-in for scene safety.
Click here for a story about the type of training that should be occurring everywhere.
Fly (and land) safely...
ase
Tuesday, November 25, 2014
DON'T TOUCH THAT KNOB!
Since the installation of Appareo video and data recorders in EMS helicopters, there have been three separate incidents - two of them fatal helicopter crashes - in which a pilot continued flight into bad weather, became disoriented, and allowed the aircraft to enter unusual attitudes.
He then reached forward and caged the attitude indicator.
DON'T DO THAT!
Let's consider what is happening The pilot elects to fly under visual flight rules into reduced ceiling or visibility. He either thinks that he is up to the task of instrument flight, or he hopes that things won't get worse and will get better shortly. Things don't get better and the pilot loses ground reference entirely. He is in the goo and cannot tell which way is up or down by looking out the window
Although he may have some experience flying on instruments, he is not proficient; and he loses control of the aircraft, allowing it to get into an unusual attitude. This often occurs during a turn back to where things were better.
By now his vestibular and proprioceptive systems are lying to him, At some point he realizes he has gone too far, and fear kicks in. It's tragic that he wasn't more afraid sooner.
He looks at his attitude indicator, and doesn't believe it. It is tilted over on it's side, and pitched up or down, and it just can't be right. He doesn't "feel" like he is turning and diving.
So he takes his hand and re-cages the gauge.
Several seconds later (at 2318:40), with the helicopter at high pitch and roll angles, the
pilot pulled a knob on the instrument panel to cage the attitude indicator (which sets it to display
a level flight attitude). Caging an attitude indicator is meant to be performed only when an
aircraft is in a level flight attitude, such as on the ground or in straight-and-level, unaccelerated
flight. As an experienced pilot and mechanic, he would have understood the conditions under
which the attitude indicator could be safely caged. Therefore, the NTSB concludes that the
pilot’s action to cage the attitude indicator outside those conditions under which it could be
safely caged indicates that he distrusted the information he was seeing. (Possible reasons for this
distrust are discussed in section 2.6.) By caging the attitude indicator while the helicopter was at
high pitch and roll angles, the pilot caused the instrument to provide erroneous attitude
indications that would be difficult to ignore in a high-stress situation
Click here for full report...
The attitude indicator, if caged while upside down, will indicate right side up. If you have just caged the attitude indicator in the picture above, with your aircraft upside down, it is still upside down!
God forbid, if you are a crew member and I have taken you into the clouds, and you see me reaching for that knob - tell me THAT WON'T WORK.
The attitude indicators on early aircraft failed often. The were considered a "secondary" instrument, less reliable than the altimeter, vertical speed indicator, heading indicator, and turn indicator. Pilots are required to demonstrate the ability to fly "partial panel" with a cover over the attitude indicator during instrument proficiency checks - but VFR EMS helicopter pilots - even though an instrument "rating" is required, do not have to take an instrument check ride. We must only demonstrate the ability to recover from an unusual attitude and shoot a single approach.
This is not enough to prepare a visual pilot for instrument conditions.
(edit: 10/02/17 Here is an excerpt from an accident report involving a pilot, patient, and medical team that crashed after encountering fog at treetop level immediately after takeoff from an interstate highway accident scene.
"The pilot's...training records indicate that he completed initial new hire ground and flight
training between April 15 and April 20, 2003. During initial flight training, he received 6.6
hours of flight training in a Bell 407 of which 1.6 hours were at night and 0.2 hour was
simulated instrument flight. He completed recurrent training in a Bell 407 on August 28,
2003, receiving 1.3 hours of flight instruction of which 0.2 hour was simulated instrument
flight. He next completed recurrent training in a Bell 407 on April 19, 2004, receiving 1.2
hours flight instruction of which 0.3 hour was simulated instrument flight. On April 27, 2004,
he satisfactorily completed the required 12-month 14 CFR 135.293 competency check and the
14 CFR 135.299 line check in a Bell 407 lasting 0.9 hour."
This training experience is typical for a VFR HEMS pilot. This pilot had zero actual instrument time. He was not ready to fly in fog or cloud and his last decision before he killed himself and his crew was to attempt to get under it. As his record shows, the instrument training provided to a VFR HEMS pilot in a VFR helicopter is extremely limited.)
So we better stop or divert before we get there - in the clouds, or snow, or heavy rain,. Stop because we aren't prepared, we aren't proficient, we aren't ready.
And three of us have proved it by putting their hand on a knob.
This pilot made the mistake - and lived to tell the tale. Click here.
Disclosure: During my last check ride with my company, I was forced to demonstrate partial panel flying, with a cover over the AI. This is the first time in twenty five years or so that I had to do this. It is very good training and something we should all do regularly. You do not need an attitude indicator to fly on instruments. Practice, practice, practice.
VFR EMS pilots should be required to take an instrument proficiency check at least once a year. A real check ride, not one approach.
Crews - do not let your VFR pilot take you into instrument conditions. Please. You can prevent a fatal crash. If you know of team members who are not as familiar with what is happening here - such as pediatric or neo-nate team members, or perfusionists - people who don't fly as often and don't hear about events like this, please call them and discuss this. You may save their lives.
Speak up!
He then reached forward and caged the attitude indicator.
DON'T DO THAT!
Let's consider what is happening The pilot elects to fly under visual flight rules into reduced ceiling or visibility. He either thinks that he is up to the task of instrument flight, or he hopes that things won't get worse and will get better shortly. Things don't get better and the pilot loses ground reference entirely. He is in the goo and cannot tell which way is up or down by looking out the window
Although he may have some experience flying on instruments, he is not proficient; and he loses control of the aircraft, allowing it to get into an unusual attitude. This often occurs during a turn back to where things were better.
By now his vestibular and proprioceptive systems are lying to him, At some point he realizes he has gone too far, and fear kicks in. It's tragic that he wasn't more afraid sooner.
He looks at his attitude indicator, and doesn't believe it. It is tilted over on it's side, and pitched up or down, and it just can't be right. He doesn't "feel" like he is turning and diving.
So he takes his hand and re-cages the gauge.
Several seconds later (at 2318:40), with the helicopter at high pitch and roll angles, the
pilot pulled a knob on the instrument panel to cage the attitude indicator (which sets it to display
a level flight attitude). Caging an attitude indicator is meant to be performed only when an
aircraft is in a level flight attitude, such as on the ground or in straight-and-level, unaccelerated
flight. As an experienced pilot and mechanic, he would have understood the conditions under
which the attitude indicator could be safely caged. Therefore, the NTSB concludes that the
pilot’s action to cage the attitude indicator outside those conditions under which it could be
safely caged indicates that he distrusted the information he was seeing. (Possible reasons for this
distrust are discussed in section 2.6.) By caging the attitude indicator while the helicopter was at
high pitch and roll angles, the pilot caused the instrument to provide erroneous attitude
indications that would be difficult to ignore in a high-stress situation
Click here for full report...
The attitude indicator, if caged while upside down, will indicate right side up. If you have just caged the attitude indicator in the picture above, with your aircraft upside down, it is still upside down!
God forbid, if you are a crew member and I have taken you into the clouds, and you see me reaching for that knob - tell me THAT WON'T WORK.
The attitude indicators on early aircraft failed often. The were considered a "secondary" instrument, less reliable than the altimeter, vertical speed indicator, heading indicator, and turn indicator. Pilots are required to demonstrate the ability to fly "partial panel" with a cover over the attitude indicator during instrument proficiency checks - but VFR EMS helicopter pilots - even though an instrument "rating" is required, do not have to take an instrument check ride. We must only demonstrate the ability to recover from an unusual attitude and shoot a single approach.
This is not enough to prepare a visual pilot for instrument conditions.
(edit: 10/02/17 Here is an excerpt from an accident report involving a pilot, patient, and medical team that crashed after encountering fog at treetop level immediately after takeoff from an interstate highway accident scene.
"The pilot's...training records indicate that he completed initial new hire ground and flight
training between April 15 and April 20, 2003. During initial flight training, he received 6.6
hours of flight training in a Bell 407 of which 1.6 hours were at night and 0.2 hour was
simulated instrument flight. He completed recurrent training in a Bell 407 on August 28,
2003, receiving 1.3 hours of flight instruction of which 0.2 hour was simulated instrument
flight. He next completed recurrent training in a Bell 407 on April 19, 2004, receiving 1.2
hours flight instruction of which 0.3 hour was simulated instrument flight. On April 27, 2004,
he satisfactorily completed the required 12-month 14 CFR 135.293 competency check and the
14 CFR 135.299 line check in a Bell 407 lasting 0.9 hour."
This training experience is typical for a VFR HEMS pilot. This pilot had zero actual instrument time. He was not ready to fly in fog or cloud and his last decision before he killed himself and his crew was to attempt to get under it. As his record shows, the instrument training provided to a VFR HEMS pilot in a VFR helicopter is extremely limited.)
So we better stop or divert before we get there - in the clouds, or snow, or heavy rain,. Stop because we aren't prepared, we aren't proficient, we aren't ready.
And three of us have proved it by putting their hand on a knob.
This pilot made the mistake - and lived to tell the tale. Click here.
Disclosure: During my last check ride with my company, I was forced to demonstrate partial panel flying, with a cover over the AI. This is the first time in twenty five years or so that I had to do this. It is very good training and something we should all do regularly. You do not need an attitude indicator to fly on instruments. Practice, practice, practice.
VFR EMS pilots should be required to take an instrument proficiency check at least once a year. A real check ride, not one approach.
Crews - do not let your VFR pilot take you into instrument conditions. Please. You can prevent a fatal crash. If you know of team members who are not as familiar with what is happening here - such as pediatric or neo-nate team members, or perfusionists - people who don't fly as often and don't hear about events like this, please call them and discuss this. You may save their lives.
Speak up!
Monday, November 24, 2014
Quick and Dirty: Posterior Hip Dislocation
Here’s a quick 5 minute video full of tips on diagnosing and managing this injury. Click here to view video.
Material from Dr. McGonigal's "The Trauma Professional's Blog" posted with permission.
Material from Dr. McGonigal's "The Trauma Professional's Blog" posted with permission.
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