Saturday, April 21, 2018

Snakes In The Grass

Contributing writer Josh Henke is an avid outdoorsman. He surfs and hikes the backcountry.  Josh is a former firefighter and serves as a flight nurse today. You can contact Josh at bosstyn@gmail.com

My friend Dave-bob is an avid hiker. Even in southern California, he finds time to hike nearly every day. Dave is old and tired and weathered, but he still hikes almost every day. We often give
him grief about his stick; low terrain, high terrain, it doesn't matter,  Dave-bob always has his
stick. After a few years of knowing Dave, I asked him about his stick and why he always carries it.


“Yes, of course,” I thought. That seems plainly obvious now that he says it. Southern California
is known for its rattlesnakes. Big black things that hide in the brush. They are a terrifying thing
when you see one.

I then asked him, “why such a big stick then”. His stick is damn near a Gandolf-sized staff.
His thoughtful reply was this; “small sticks are good for small snakes, but not big ones. A big
stick is good for small snakes as well as big ones. I use this stick to roust snakes up along the
trail before they have a chance to strike”

I thought about this in an oft way for weeks as a continued on with life. A few weeks after that
conversation, I saw Dave and he told me a story about hiking. (he loves to tell hiking stories)
Dave told me about how he went hiking at a place called four bush; which actually only has
three bushes, but never mind.

He was driving up to the trailhead listening to a deeply riveting Paul Harvey episode when he
parked. As many of us do with Paul Harvey, he sat and listened for a while longer. One of those
driveway moments….
He told me how he began his hike and realized he forgot his stick about 3 miles into the trip.
“I figured oh well,” he said and continued on. At mile four he saw a “really interesting bird. Kind
of a grasshopper/bird/old cat kinda thing”. (Dave loves to describe things he sees, however,
he’s not very good at describing more than making up combinations of animals to describe
other animals)
“when I go to the top I stopped and turned around to head back down, and sure as hell, there
was a big black rattlesnake sitting in the path about 5 yards in front of me. He wasn't moving,
just laying in the sun”.

We both took a silent second to think about that snake, A big slate colored rattlesnake is no
joke, and 6 miles into a hike; a bite from a snake like that is often a death sentence. (or a
helicopter ride at least)
“I sat there and looked at that snake and all I could think about was my damn stick. He looked
at me and I looked at him, and as we both sat there, he began to move. Not fast; he moved in
a very slow, purposeful way directly towards me. As I back up he stopped. When I stopped, he
began moving again. Not in a “hunter” way, but in a “you’re damn lucky Dave” kinda way; as if
he was telling me “I’m not going to bite you, but this is your only warning.”

I commiserated with him over the snake knowing that you can't just step over it, and
often times on these trails, you are surrounded by grass. The only option for Dave was to leave
the trail and clear around the snake through the grass. The hard part is, there's often snakes in the
grass, and with no stick, it's a big gamble.

Dave did leave the trail, walking through the grass. He was more than a little worried about it, I could
hear it in his voice as he related his “trail of fears."
The story made me think about sticks and snakes. It also made me think about complacency
and the dangers we face, how the snakes are always in the grass and about how having a
good stick is often salvation.

I recalled when I was a new flight nurse. Most times when we got a call we would pile into the
aircraft, even before the pilot. We would buckle in even before the pilot had turned up. Once
we got comms, we would ask where we were going and he would point and say something like
“that way about 19 miles”

We didn’t check the weather with him. We didn’t scout the LZ prior to leaving. Hell, we didn’t even
ask him where we were going. We just hopped up, strapped in and blasted off. We weren't crew, we were pax.

I'm not afraid to admit it, we had very small sticks.
They did not provide us with a good defense against the snakes in the grass.
Sure, if the helicopter was leaking oil or started smoking on startup, we could see that and cancel the
flight, but our small stick was no good at picking out the less obvious snakes such as weather in
a small valley, knowledge of a known tight LZ, etc.

Over time I found that my stick got bigger.
And the bigger my stick got, the better prepared I was to meet a snake on the trail or go
wandering off through the grass unplanned.
I grew my stick by asking questions of my pilots. I questioned things that looked wrong. I took a deeply vested interest in my safety by speaking up and looking for “snakes” in our day to day operations.

I read the archives and thoughtfully explored how a crew got themselves into a situation and
how I could avoid such mistakes in the future.
I wrote about ideas and thoughts I had on safety and how to make others think about safety
All of these things, both big and small, helped me grow my stick to a point where I felt I could
go hiking safely and face down the dangers in the grass, no matter how big.
We as flight crews need big sticks. Complacency is a snake in the grass and small sticks just
won't do. As Dave mentioned, “small sticks only work for small snakes, but a big stick works for
all snakes.”
As we hit the “trail” day in and day out, think about the snakes in the grass you may encounter.
Don’t get distracted before you begin your hike through HEMS. Take the time to remember your stick, because if you forget it, that snake may bite you.

If you have a HEMS related story to tell - something that might help another crew - drop us a line.

Saturday, March 24, 2018

The Airlines are Hiring Helicopter Pilots!

Is it time for a change of pace? There are programs sponsored by the airlines in which a commercial helicopter pilot can receive transition training and land an airline job...

We tend to favor competitive environments, you either get better or you get lost. The developing competition for a relatively scarce resource - a commercial pilot - has been brought on by the conditions created by aviation employers. When Sully said (the airlines) should respect the profession, no one listened. "The life" of an airline pilot - especially one flying for a regional carrier - became less and less desirable. This was all made starkly apparent during the investigation into the Colgan Air crash near Wilkes Barre. Low wages and crash-pad life drove prospective candidates, especially rotor-pilots coming out of the military, into off-shore or HEMS jobs.
Perhaps the airline industry has passed the nadir; perhaps becoming an airline pilot will once again be a good-paying, respectable employment option. .As the airlines cherry-pick the best rotor-pilots - many of whom have and will continue to come from the ranks of HEMS - a predictable set of events will occur.

First, companies will try and force overtime on current pilots. Lean is cheap, and there are more vacancies in HEMS than ever before. Eventually, there will be too many holes to fill. As well, HEMS companies will look to hire the very young and the very old. They will dip deeper and deeper into the labor pool.

We can imagine a conversation like this between two new-hire HEMS pilots.

"Hey, young fellow! When I started flying, you were in diapers."

"Oh yeah, Gramps? Well, when I finish flying, it'll be you in the diapers. As a matter of fact, you look pretty 'dependable' today!"

Barring restraint, and with bases out of service, some companies will hire pilots previously let go; pilots who are too new to get any other job or who have hit the 65 year age limit for part 121 flying. Companies will also seek to lower the hiring-requirements for HEMS pilot. If the rules get in the way of making money, the first thing you do is change the rules.

We expect that these developments will show up in the accident and error rate, and they will result in clinicians departing HEMS after becoming dismayed at the lack of proficiency of the persons flying. (At least those clinicians who know what a lack of proficiency looks like.) Flying a single-pilot VFR helicopter to an accident scene at 3am is different than flying an airliner as a member of a flight crew. It's not necessarily harder, but it is different. It requires an entirely different set of interpersonal and aviation skills.

The transitioning rotor pilot will serve in the airlines as a co-pilot until his or her performance has been verified. A retiring airline pilot entering HEMS will be given 8 to 10 hours and a check ride before being cast loose upon the skies. And the med crews.

When you pay peanuts, you hire monkeys.

The members of many professions join together in associations to set standards for entry, professional development, and performance. Unlike doctors, lawyers, accountants, and engineers; pilots are unable or unwilling to form a true professional association with the legitimacy and power to set standards and conditions.

If you can't find a pilot with 3000 hours and an ATP willing to take your job at the salary offered, well, the simple answer is to lower the requirements. We witnessed that exact development ourselves between 1998 and 2004. As rotor-pilots explore other options, we will undoubtedly see more of the same.

But, at some point, insurance rates and astronomical lawsuits will drive the fix most strenuously avoided by the HEMS industry.

Wages will increase, perhaps to a point commensurate with generated-revenues.

After all, the airlines are hiring.

Monday, February 26, 2018

What is Your Tolerance for Turbulence?

A witness said survivors of the crash ran out of the helicopter screaming
Image courtesy Teddy Fujimoto and AZCentral.com
The question of the day...

What is Your Tolerance for Turbulence?

Is it a light tossing? Significant slams? Occasional loss of control? Are you more concerned with turbulence at altitude or near the surface? How much wind will you tolerate near mountainous terrain or large buildings?

Let's consider an event from 2002...

"The medevac helicopter lifted off the hospital's rooftop helipad at night. The pilot made a right pedal turn to the northwest, facing a building that extended above the height of the helipad by approximately 10-feet. The paramedic said that when the helicopter was about 20-feet above the helipad, and while he was programming the GPS receiver, a "sudden gust" of wind push the helicopter from directly behind. He was not alerted to anything unusual until he looked up and noticed the helicopter's close proximity to a 16-floor brick building, located at the northern corner of the heliport, which extended above the height of the helipad by 4 floors. The paramedic yelled, "building, building, building!" to alert the pilot. The pilot then made a rapid right cyclic input to avoid hitting the building, but the helicopter struck the building and fell about 13 floors to ground level. The paramedic did not see or hear any warning lights, horns or unusual noises, and was not aware of any mechanical problems with the helicopter. A police officer who flew two missions in the local area prior to the accident said the wind speed at 500 feet agl was at least 25 knots and gusting from the south/southwest. He stood on the primary helipad after the accident and said mechanical turbulence from the building was evident. An FAA inspector who also stood on the rooftop helipad after the accident said the wind gusts were about 20-30 knots from the southwest and they swirled around the heliport. Review of the helicopter flight manual revealed, "Directional controllability during take-off and landing is assured for flight condition with crosswind components up to 17 [knots]." (added - do you know the conditions under which that number was derived?)

Here's another bit from a later event,

On March 6, 2015, at 2310 central standard time, an Airbus Helicopters (Eurocopter) EC-130-B4 ... struck the edge of a hospital building and impacted its parking lot during a visual approach to the St Louis University Hospital elevated rooftop helipad (MO55), St Louis, Missouri. During the approach, the helicopter experienced a loss of directional control and entered an uncontrolled descent. The helicopter was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The helicopter was operated under Title 14 CFR Part 91 as an air medical positioning flight that was operating on a company flight plan. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight was returning to MO55 after it had been refueled at the operator’s base in St. Louis, Missouri.

The flight’s first approach and landing at MO55 was to drop off a medic, nurse, and a patient. During the approach, the pilot reported to the flight nurse and medic that winds were gusting to 25 knots. The flight nurse stated that helicopter was yawing quite a bit and there was a noticeable roll side to side during landing. The helicopter landed without incident during the first approach and landing. The flight then departed to obtain fuel at the operator’s base and then departed to return to MO55, to pick up the medic and flight nurse.The accident occurred during the return’s approach for landing at MO55.

Does your General Operations Manual provide your pilots clear and unambiguous
guidance to be followed upon encountering turbulence? Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?
If not, what are you waiting for?

And here is yet another comment in the media regarding a crash for which the investigation is ongoing.

"More than 20 first responders had to hike to the downed helicopter from an area only accessible with certain vehicles. Emergency crews then had to wait for strong winds to quiet before they could lift passengers out of the canyon."
In this event, a bystander reported gusts to 50 miles per hour on the upper rim of the canyon.

Here is a bit of text from "Skybrary" on turbulence.

"Air moving over or around high ground may create turbulence in the lee of the terrain feature. This may produce violent and, for smaller aircraft, potentially uncontrollable effects resulting in pitch and/or roll to extreme positions"

Of course, we don't ever want to fly our helicopters into "uncontrollable" conditions. Do we? The question is; how close to uncontrollable should we get? The answer is not in the rotorcraft flight manual. The manufacturer wants to sell you an aircraft, not talk you out of it. The answer is also most-likely not coming from your company. They leave a decision like this up to you the pilot - and to a lesser extent the medical team. "Tribal knowledge" has been offered as guidance. Or perhaps we should ask ourselves "what would the other guys do?"

Here's the problem with that idea... What if the other guys are out flying because we are? What if we are all waiting for the first crew to say "stop!"

I humbly offer a bit of advice. If at any time you feel that turbulence is putting you at risk for loss of control and unplanned contact with an obstacle,...

Knock it off!

"The pilot reported that he performed his approach into the wind. On short final he could feel periodic gusts of wind. The pilot executed the standard approach to the helipad and the helicopter encountered another gust that picked the helicopter's nose up as it was moving over the pad. He maneuvered the helicopter to center it over the pad when he heard a sound like "metal on metal as if the tail rotor had hit something a couple times." The pilot felt no initial feedback in the controls, he felt the helicopter yaw to the left, and the helicopter continued to yaw to the left with his full application of right pedal. He lowered the collective and rolled off the throttle to enter a hovering autorotation and attempted to land it as level as possible. The helicopter landed hard. The operator reported substantial ground damage occurred to the tail rotor gearbox and tail rotor blades and a review of images revealed damage to the tail boom. A nearby fence and light were reported to be damaged. The operator's accident report indicated that there were no mechanical malfunctions with the helicopter.

Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from the ground obstacle during the landing with gusting winds present."

Are you performing operations near an obstructed confined area or a perilous pinnacle? Are you getting your butt handed to you?

Go to a big flat airport with few obstacles and greater chances for stable flowing winds. That's where manufacturers test for controllability. Give yourself the same benefits that the test pilots get.

Tuesday, January 2, 2018

Thank you for stopping by...

Each of us has an obligation to pass on what we have learned, as others
passed knowledge and experience on to us.

Greetings friends and Happy New Year!

In the spirit of new beginnings, I am henceforth going to focus on writing for Vertical 911 with the help of my friend and editor Elan Head.  The frequency of posts here will likely decrease since getting paid for writing is more fun. I never received a penny for any of this, yet it has been the most rewarding experience imaginable. I recommend blogging to anyone - and anyone has stories to tell. And it's free! On occasion, I spoke truth to power - and that was refreshing. I have had strangers walk up to me at conferences, look me in the eye, and thank me for this blog.

Free and Priceless!

I want to thank each of you who have stopped by to visit HelicopterEMS.com, and especially those of you who took the time to comment - and in some cases - to contribute to the blog.  When I began this project it was a natural progression from visiting Lyn Burks' bulletin board at "JustHelicopters.com"  and discussing helicopter topics there. I was an active HEMS pilot, had time on my hands, and things to say. Blogger offered a platform for that discussion. I remember exclaiming to my flight-nurse wife Jeanne that two hundred people had visited the blog! That number now approaches a quarter of a million. It has been a ton of fun!

I hope that you who have visited, and you who visit anew have or will derive some enjoyment from the thoughts of a common helicopter pilot. When I started, Air Methods was a middling-sized outfit, Omniflight was in ascension, OCC's were a new development, and crashes were all too common. Somewhere along the way, I began to think that maybe one person with a keyboard could affect the number of fatal crashes we experience in HEMS.

Crazy right?

HEMS doesn't pay much, but there is a great view from the office. At Beaufort Memorial
with the Green Machine - she's been there and done that and got a new tail.I was
thinking of her when I wrote "Out of Sight but Never Out of Mind-Tail Rotor Tales"

On the last USHST conference call, a speaker talked about the personal side of safety education and outreach. What I took away from his comments is that we have to make an emotional connection - as well as a cognitive one - with the people who climb in helicopters and decide how to operate them. I think that is the key, and rather than differentiating the people who have crashed and killed themselves and others, I think it's best to relate to them as personally as possible: To understand their humanity, their strengths and weaknesses, and what might have led them to disaster. Once we relate to crash victims, to "see their side of the story," then perhaps we are in a better position to understand when we might be on the path to a fatal-end ourselves. Rather than beating people over the head with a litany of criticisms and mandates, we should "nudge" flight teams in the right direction; toward safety and success and long life.

Life is Good, right?

From my time spent on this blog I got to be involved with NEMSPA. I got to meet Josh Henke and Krista Haugen and Jonathan Godfrey, and Kurt and Miles and Bill. And maybe I got to meet you. I  got to present at several AMTCs, and perhaps I was able to make HEMS just a little bit better.

My most fervent desire was for us to experience a complete year without anyone being killed. And we - make that YOU - did it. And we could do it again if we set our minds to the task.
I certainly hope so - because there isn't anyone on earth I admire more than a HEMS flight-team. We are blessed to have people who walk out to a helicopter at 3am and launch into a night sky to help others. We should do everything possible to ensure their success.

I wish you every success and hope you will check out my columns in Vertical 911. If there is something you want to talk about or want me to write about, let me or Elan know. She is my editor and counselor and coach. Meeting her made this all better.

Best wishes for 2018 and beyond


In "Ejection Decision" I wrote about a flight with Jill and Don. That's Don
on the right. Fast with a tube and fun to fly with...

Wednesday, November 1, 2017

Baby It's Cold Outside...

Crash review: two on the same day, two for the same reason...

Read. Do not repeat...

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA121
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, January 02, 2013 in Seminole, OK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/08/2014
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER EC130 B4, registration: N334AM
Injuries: 4 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported hearing a sound like something had struck the helicopter shortly after departure while about 1,600 to 1,700 feet mean sea level. The engine lost power, and the pilot performed an autorotation to a field. While maneuvering to land, he saw a barbed wire fence obstructing the intended landing area, so he maneuvered the helicopter to clear the fence. The helicopter subsequently cleared the fence and landed hard in a field.
Engine examination revealed that the four axial compressor blades exhibited significant deformation on the outboard tips of their leading edges in the direction opposite of normal rotation consistent with the ingestion of soft body foreign object debris, such as ice. A subsequent engine run did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. For 3 days before the accident flight, the helicopter was parked outside without its engine cover installed and was exposed to light drizzle, rain, mist, and fog. The engine inlet cover was installed the day before the accident at an unknown time. The helicopter remained outside and exposed to freezing temperatures throughout the night until 2 hours before the flight. Although the helicopter was maintained in a ready status on the helipad and maintenance personnel performed daily preflight/airworthiness checks, the inlet to the first-stage of the axial compressor was not inspected to ensure that it was free of ice in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual. Based on the weather conditions that the helicopter was exposed to during the 3 days before the accident, it is likely that ice formed in the engine air inlet before the flight and that, when the pilot increased the engine power during takeoff, the accumulated ice separated from the inlet and was ingested by the engine and damaged the compressor blades.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The loss of engine power due to ice ingestion. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel’s delayed decision to install the helicopter's engine inlet cover until after the engine had been exposed to moisture and freezing temperatures and their inadequate daily preflight/airworthiness checks, which did not detect the ice formation.


NTSB Identification: CEN13FA122
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, January 02, 2013 in Clear Lake, IA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/12/2015
Aircraft: BELL HELICOPTER 407, registration: N445MT
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

GPS tracking data revealed that, after departure, the helicopter proceeded westbound about 600 ft above ground level (agl), following a roadway. About 6 minutes after liftoff, when the helicopter was about 3/4 mile south of the accident site, it turned right and became established on a northerly course. The helicopter subsequently turned left and appeared to be on a southerly heading at the final data point. Shortly before beginning the left turn, the helicopter entered a climb, reached an altitude of about 1,800 ft agl, and then entered a descent that continued until impact. Weather observations from the nearest Automated Surface Observing System, located about 7 miles east of the accident site, indicated that the ceilings and visibility appeared to be adequate for nighttime helicopter operations and did not detect any freezing precipitation. Although an airmen’s meteorological information advisory for icing conditions was current for the route of flight, and several pilot reports of icing conditions had been filed, none of the reports were in the immediate vicinity of the intended route of flight. Witnesses and first responders reported mist, drizzle, and icy road conditions at the time of the accident. It is likely that the pilot inadvertently encountered localized icing conditions, which resulted in his subsequent in-flight loss of helicopter control. A postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions. The engine control unit recorded engine torque, engine overspeed, and rotor overspeed events; however, due to their timing and nature, the events were likely a result of damage that occurred during the impact sequence. Evidence also indicated that the cyclic centering, engine overspeed, and hydraulic system warning lights illuminated; it is also likely that their illumination was associated with the impact sequence. Further, the engine anti-ice status light was illuminated, which was consistent with the activation of the anti-ice system at some point during the accident flight.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s inadvertent encounter with localized icing conditions and his subsequent in-flight loss of helicopter control.


NTSB Identification: CEN13FA174
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, February 22, 2013 in Oklahoma City, OK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/14/2016
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER AS 350 B2, registration: N917EM
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The emergency medical services helicopter departed a hospital helipad in dark night visual flight rules conditions and proceeded on its mission. Satellite data showed that, after takeoff, the helicopter began a gradual climb toward its planned destination. The data stopped about 3 minutes and 30 seconds into the flight. No distress calls were heard from the pilot. Fixed video surveillance cameras located near the accident site showed the last few seconds of the helicopter descending toward the ground. The helicopter impacted a parking lot, and a postimpact fire occurred.
Examination of the wreckage revealed that three of the engine’s first-stage axial compressor blades exhibited deformation consistent with soft body foreign object damage. The remainder of the engine and airframe exhibited no evidence of malfunction that would have contributed to an in-flight loss of engine power.
The helicopter’s air intake design, which had been modified to accommodate a different engine than that originally supplied by the helicopter’s manufacturer, incorporated a blanking plate attached to the top side of the engine cowling that covered a portion of the air inlet screen. A gap in the area where the blanking plate and the screen overlapped made it possible, in certain meteorological conditions, for water or snow to pass through the screen, accumulate on the blanking plate, and freeze into ice. Ice accumulation in this area, if left undetected, could result in the ice detaching from the blanking plate and entering the engine during operation, causing soft body foreign object damage and a loss of engine power. Precipitation and outside temperatures ranging from 35 to 19 degrees F occurred during the 12-hour period preceding the accident. The combination of these meteorological conditions was conducive to the formation and accumulation of ice in the area between the air inlet screen and the blanking plate.
Although the helicopter’s flight manual supplement for cold weather operations recommended installation of an air inlet cover after the last flight of the day, during the day and night before the flight, the helicopter was parked outside on the helipad without an air inlet cover installed. According to the helicopter’s mechanic, he inspected the helicopter on the afternoon before the flight and noted that some snow had accumulated on it. It is likely that the lack of an engine air inlet cover allowed precipitation to accumulate in the vicinity of the engine air intake.
The helicopter’s flight manual cold weather operations supplement also contained instructions for the pilot to perform a visual and manual (tactile) inspection of the air intake duct up to the first-stage compressor for evidence of snow and ice. Furthermore, the manufacturer and the Federal Aviation Administration had previously released information notices regarding inflight loss of engine power due to snow or ice ingestion caused by inadequate inspection or removal of snow or ice from the engine air inlet. These notices recommended a thorough inspection in and around the engine inlet area in order to detect and remove any snow or ice accumulation before flight.
The initial on-scene examination found no remnants of ice or snow on these components because exposure to the postcrash fire would have melted such evidence. Surveillance video of the helipad showed that most of the helipad lights were off at the time of the pilot’s preflight inspection immediately before the flight, making it difficult for him to detect any ice or snow accumulation in the area of the engine air intake. Thus, the ice accumulation between the air inlet screen and the blanking plate remained undetected, and shortly after takeoff, the ice detached from the blanking plate, slid into the air inlet, and was subsequently ingested by the engine, resulting in an in-flight loss of engine power.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The loss of engine power due to engine ice ingestion during initial climb after takeoff in dark night light conditions. Contributing to the accident were the lack of an installed engine air inlet cover while the helicopter was parked outside, exposed to precipitation and freezing temperatures before the accident, and the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection that failed to detect ice accumulation in the area of the air inlet.

Tuesday, October 10, 2017

AAMS 2017 Award Winners Announced...Jobs Well Done!

The Association of Air Medical Services has announced the winners of this year's community awards. While all the winners are undoubtedly deserving and have our congratulations - we know two of them. And we are excited for them and their achievements. And as for the award for an air medical mechanic? Well, it's just wonderful to see a mechanic being recognized. Perhaps it's time for an Air Medical Mechanics Association? Way to go friends! We are proud of you!

To see the other award winners, click here...