tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-53863719941515184982024-03-15T18:10:03.192-07:00HelicopterEMS.comNews, safety related information, and personal experiences concerning taking care by air. All rights reserved.Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.comBlogger421125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-18749388960521933032023-10-28T08:55:00.001-07:002023-10-28T08:55:51.890-07:00DON'T TICKLE THE DRAGON!<p><br /></p><p><i>(This article originally appeared as a safety column submission in Vertical Valor/911. I reshare it here in the hope that it may offer some benefit to the HEMS industry. DCF)</i></p><p><br /></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6H6rbm0qVJ8ZV2b5PgB_bTIFhkoBuojDzjI3WUC4kknflI5oktpeR_jM8WZXvcRCEhJubLICmustGLM-J3PLnjiDa23kSm_oyr9ly13RD5ayrwPpLhyPI-OLu22qsceCXgfSHOJmGCn5rc9i3czR7QV9nmiMPq-i4uzSmCk7GTdRjxxh_PRSnBJrhzfA/s1040/chinese-dragon.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="520" data-original-width="1040" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6H6rbm0qVJ8ZV2b5PgB_bTIFhkoBuojDzjI3WUC4kknflI5oktpeR_jM8WZXvcRCEhJubLICmustGLM-J3PLnjiDa23kSm_oyr9ly13RD5ayrwPpLhyPI-OLu22qsceCXgfSHOJmGCn5rc9i3czR7QV9nmiMPq-i4uzSmCk7GTdRjxxh_PRSnBJrhzfA/w400-h200/chinese-dragon.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">image courtesy historyskills.com</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p>I wish I could describe what real terror feels like. Words don't suffice. Either you have been there, or it's hyperbole.</p><p>Recently, my neighbor lost track of his 3-year-old. He ran through his house, gradually becoming frantic. No kid. He ran over to my house, opened the door and yelled: "is he here?"</p><p>"No."</p><p>We both went out front, and he yelled for his son at the top of his voice. The anguish and despair apparent in that call were very powerful. I witnessed full-blown terror in another human being. I have felt it in myself. </p><p>My moments of terror took place in a Chinook in 1987. I was a young co-pilot, and my pilot-in-command and I had flown from Fort Bragg North Carolina to an airshow in Virginia. The hot humid summer day wore on, and clouds began to build. As we prepared to depart in the gathering dusk, he told me that we would return to base IFR.</p><p>Cool! Cloud time!</p><p>We planned and filed and got ourselves into the clouds headed home. Unfortunately, we didn't have airborne weather radar and data-linked radar didn’t exist. I learned about embedded thunderstorms that day. We were in a large, powerful aircraft - we weighed around 32,000 pounds against a max-gross weight of 50,000. We had lots of reserve power. We had heading-select and altitude-hold. We had each other. </p><p>We got our butts handed to us. </p><p>When you stumble into a worsening storm two things come to mind. How bad will this god-awful hammering get? And how strong is this helicopter?</p><p>Thank God Boeing builds a mighty strong machine. I have never been so scared - before or since - as I was that evening. I was so scared I started giggling. And then I started flying away from the course line on the horizontal situation indicator (HSI). My brain quit. If we had been in a light helicopter, the kind we use for HEMS, I would be dead.</p><p>We turned off altitude hold and gave up on maintaining an altitude. We got slammed up, down, and sideways. </p><p>The wind gusts put the blades out of phase and the helicopter shook mightily. The rain on the windshield and forward pylon made a roaring sound that mixed with the blood roaring in my head. It was all I could do to maintain aircraft control. My PIC started shaking his head, the expression on his face was one of pure dread.</p><p>You only have to learn that lesson once. Don't mess with a thunderstorm. When I remember that flight, it invokes imagery, "visually descriptive or figurative language..." </p><p>Here's some imagery... Don't tickle the dragon!</p><p>I came into HEMS fresh from duty as a flight-lead in the 160th SOAR, with an attitude that was spring-loaded to the go-position. I was a real "can-do" guy. I used to run to the helicopter, and I went inadvertent-IMC twice in my first year of HEMS flying. I was going to get it done. I felt that being a can-do guy made me a better pilot than many of my peers. I was willing to do things that others weren't. There are still people like that in our industry today, and I fear for their safety - and the safety of the teams who climb in with them. </p><p>In Ernest Gann’s aviation classic "Fate is the Hunter," he posits that fate pulls the strings of our destiny. I don't believe this premise; that it's all about luck, but I can tell you from experience that bad choices improve fate's aim. Back in the day, I made several really bad choices - so bad that more than once my fate did come down to dumb luck. Another pilot from that era with a similarly fatalistic bent said this: </p><p><i>“Death is the handmaiden of the pilot. Sometimes it comes by accident, sometimes by an act of God.” </i></p><p>I believe that most accidents aren’t. And I think it’s most-often us doing the bad-acting, not God.</p><p>Consider his case, a pilot with more than 9000 hours of experience. A pilot who was experienced with flying many different aircraft. "he was formerly an aeronautical research pilot with the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) High-Speed Flight Station at Edwards Air Force Base, California... On November 20, 1953, he became the first human to fly faster than twice the speed of sound in the Douglas D-558-II Skyrocket. From 1955 to 1960, he was employed by North American Aviation as the chief engineering test pilot during the development and testing of the X-15 rocketplane." (NTSB report)</p><p>It's interesting that this pilot was involved in the beginnings of supersonic flight because such flights also invoked imagery in the minds of writers at the time.</p><p><i>"There was a demon that lived in the air. They said whoever challenged him would die. His controls would freeze up, his plane would buffet wildly, and he would disintegrate. The demon lived at Mach 1 on the meter, seven hundred and fifty miles an hour, where the air could no longer move out of the way. He lived behind a barrier through which they said no man would ever pass. They called it the sound barrier. </i>(From the 1983 movie 'The Right Stuff.")</p><p>Well, as it turns out, there is no demon lurking behind the sound barrier. Indeed, there is no "barrier" at all. Just some aerodynamic phenomena that engineers and designers were able to overcome long ago. </p><p>Now let's talk about thunderstorms. Tangle with a thunderstorm and your aircraft may indeed buffet wildly and disintegrate. The Airman's Information Manual covers the topic in detail, but it's hard to get the full effect of what they are saying when you are reading the text safe and warm in an easy chair. They write, "avoid by at least 20 miles any thunderstorm identified as severe or giving an intense radar echo. This is especially true under the anvil of a large cumulonimbus." and also "above all, remember this: never regard any thunderstorm 'lightly' even when radar observers report the echoes are of light intensity. Avoiding thunderstorms is the best policy." </p><p>I cannot over-emphasize the importance of taking this to heart, but not everyone does.</p><p>A HEMS pilot decided that he was going to get home after dropping a patient at a distant hospital. A peer warned him about storms approaching the destination, and the victim ignored the warning. He almost only killed himself, but as he was preparing to depart, the crew popped out of a door and waved to come aboard.</p><p>"Although the pilot encountered an area of deteriorating weather, this did not have to occur as the pilot could have chosen to stay at the hospital helipad. The pilot, however, decided to enter the area of weather, despite the availability of a safer option. Based on the pilot’s statement to the oncoming pilot about the need to “beat the storm” and his intention to leave the flight nurses behind and bring the helicopter back... he was aware of the storm and still chose to fly into it. The pilot made a risky decision to attempt to outrun the storm in night conditions, which would enable him to return the helicopter to its home base and end his shift there, rather than choosing a safer alternative of parking the helicopter in a secure area and exploring alternate transportation arrangements or waiting for the storm to pass and returning to base after sunrise when conditions improved. This decision-making error played an important causal role in this accident." (NTSB)</p><p>The initial mistake was in leaving the distant hospital. He had been offered a van ride and turned the offer down. As he proceeded he was probably evaluating conditions - thinking he could stop if it got too bad. As he crept closer and closer to the dragon, he might have been thinking, "well, we made it this far and now we are almost there." He could have decided to land anywhere along the way, but as he was in for a penny, he was in for a pound. "The helicopter crashed in an open wheat field about 2.5 miles east of the home base." </p><p>Any pilot should study decision-making in naturalistic environments. The real world isn't rational, neat, or orderly, and HEMS puts us in high-consequence, time-critical situations. There isn't enough time to think things through, and the penalty for choosing wrong means someone suffers or dies. </p><p>One of the key points in the study of naturalistic decision-making is that experience doesn’t always equal good judgment. Very experienced people - even pilots with 9000 hours - make bad choices; partly because they recognize situations as similar to past experiences and use heuristics. Rather than making the best choice, they pick a choice that works, a choice that "satisfices." Too often, the results don't suffice or satisfy.</p><p>An experienced person is also liable to think "Well, I did this before and got away with it." Such an attitude might manifest like this, "The pilot also discussed the weather with an acquaintance, mentioning that he might need to work his way around some weather." The urge to keep pressing on and the lack of concern about being in the vicinity of convective weather prompted a tragic choice. "The airplane entered the severe convective weather; the pilot then requested and received clearance from the air traffic controller to initiate a turn to escape the weather. The airplane was lost from radar about 30 seconds after the pilot initiated the turn."</p><p>A toxic soup of hazardous attitudes combined to kill this good man - an aviation hero and icon. It wasn't a demon that did him in, it was a thunderstorm - a dragon! </p><p><a href="https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20060501X00494&AKey=1&RType=HTML&IType=MA" target="_blank">You can read more about this event here.</a><br /></p><p>The last of these events I will dredge up involves an almost identical scenario. From reading the text, I imagine that it's the same NTSB investigator in two of these investigations. I bet after picking through rubble and body parts and then having to write about it, he feels sick about these outcomes and wishes us pilots would behave differently.</p><p>In this case, the pilot was a friend of mine. After he was hired, I briefed him on being a base manager, helped him start his base, and witnessed him making bad choices. I guess in the end I wasn't a very good friend because if I had been, I would have talked to him before the fact instead of talking about him after. The problem is, when you raise your voice before a crash, people think you are crazy or bad for business. There isn't much pleasure in saying "I told you so."</p><p>"Although the pilot encountered an area of deteriorating weather and IMC, this did not have to occur as the pilot did not have to enter the weather and could have returned to (a safe) airport or landed at an alternate location. The pilot, however, chose to enter the area of weather, despite the availability of safer options.” (NTSB)</p><p>Now here's the crazy part of this event. This pilot knew the weather was bad in the area. He had just flown through it. Indeed he warned another pilot not to go there...</p><p>"...the pilot of the accident helicopter contacted (another pilot) by radio and advised him to double check the weather before returning to (the area) The accident pilot stated that “bad thunderstorms” were in the area and that he did not know if he would be able to return to his base that night."(NTSB)</p><p>None of the people I am discussing here were bad. None of them were dumb. These were good, smart souls who fell prey to a bad choice. If you fly, you owe it to yourself to try and understand what it was that led to these choices. You should understand that these folks were just like us. And if they could make a bad choice, so might we. After all, the last thing we want is for the NTSB to write our epitaph,</p><p>"Based on the pilot’s statement ... regarding bad thunderstorms in the area, he was aware of the weather and still chose to fly into it." </p><p>These pilots tickled the dragon and it ate them. </p><p>Don't tickle the dragon.</p><div><br /></div>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-58814728253932573062023-10-28T08:05:00.006-07:002023-10-28T08:18:17.578-07:00First, Do No Harm<p><br /></p><p><i>(This article originally appeared as a safety column submission in Vertical Valor/911. I reshare it here in the hope that it may offer some benefit to the HEMS industry. DCF)</i></p><p>The Duke Life Flight crash has sat squarely in the middle of my mental desktop since it happened. That aircraft was sophisticated and equipped with redundant power and a well-trained pilot. Duke did everything right. They spent the money. Why? What? How? </p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0FtJRM1FTKVVK_gVYCnNQxeLKlWep7LmERNP6_cWS3TGkBlRoiodeCDp5MsHrZj9a88cWo4PZlAUTHpQHimKgkAmIrZPHzY4n-F7qw8pWEbGx8uQqCZyO9lkLu-YgroQIZ51FrKq1ZgYSuda1RdhvoufQCpn2SMVstzf3xwIm2B4HVw07AgmuEfOOFSs/s960/10329207_10102478024950058_1221670694541083074_n.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="960" data-original-width="960" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0FtJRM1FTKVVK_gVYCnNQxeLKlWep7LmERNP6_cWS3TGkBlRoiodeCDp5MsHrZj9a88cWo4PZlAUTHpQHimKgkAmIrZPHzY4n-F7qw8pWEbGx8uQqCZyO9lkLu-YgroQIZ51FrKq1ZgYSuda1RdhvoufQCpn2SMVstzf3xwIm2B4HVw07AgmuEfOOFSs/s320/10329207_10102478024950058_1221670694541083074_n.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Image courtesy LifeNet 4 in SC. A super crew!</td></tr></tbody></table><br /><p>When I first looked at the headline about the accident report, I was disappointed that the NTSB had--apparently--faulted the pilot for "shutting down the wrong engine." It’s not that simple. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) opined that “the pilot of the Duke Life Flight helicopter that crashed in 2017, killing all four people on board, likely received confusing cockpit indications that led to him shutting down the wrong engine during an in-flight emergency.” </p><p>It’s worth discussing the idea that maybe, just maybe, when faced with confusing or conflicting information about an aircraft malfunction, a pilot might consider doing nothing initially beyond landing if that option is available; especially when single pilot.</p><p>“Stress-induced limitations on human performance capabilities are often overlooked when considering how crews respond to emergency and abnormal situations. These limitations have important implications (emphasis added) for the most effective designs of non-normal procedures and checklists and the design of training for non-normal situations. Berman, Dismukes, and Loukopoulos (2005) conducted an in-depth analysis of human cognitive performance issues in airline accidents. Their analysis demonstrates that normal cognitive limitations experienced by all humans when dealing with stress, concurrent task demands, and time pressure, underlie those errors made by crews when responding to emergency or abnormal situations.” (https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20060023295)</p><p>While a pilot flying a large jet airplane several thousands of feet up in the atmosphere might be forced by circumstance to “do something” in order to get the aircraft safely on the ground, a helicopter pilot flying at one or two thousand feet above a suitable landing surface may have the option of landing and then diagnosing. Too often, while trying to simultaneously fly and diagnose a problem and take steps to mitigate said problem, pilots misdiagnose and make mistakes. </p><p>Reading "I wasn’t sure what was happening so I decided to land and then sort it out," in an event report would be better than reading “the pilot was given confusing information by the aircraft systems displays and shut down the wrong engine which led to a fatal crash” in an accident report; don’t you think?</p><p>This is just another iteration of “the most conservative response rule.” and is in line with a physician’s pledge to “first, do no harm.” We all have heard the pilot’s guidance to “aviate, navigate, communicate,” and maybe you have heard the phrase “put down the radio and fly the aircraft.” These axioms emphasize the importance of aircraft control, first and foremost.</p><p>While discussing this idea in a hangar full of team members in New York, the CEO of Mercy Flight Central reminded the class of what he was taught during Navy flight training. Only half-joking, he said that when a Navy pilot is faced with an emergency the first thing they are taught to do is “wind the clock.” I submit that if you can land the aircraft in the time it takes to wind up the clock you might be better off landing.</p><p>While reading the Duke docket, I learned about an Avera McKinnon EC-145 that suffered a similar malfunction to the Duke aircraft. In the pilot's statement, he writes that at one point "I was trying to figure out what was happening with the aircraft." He was confused by what he was seeing and hearing and smelling. I consider this an indictment against the designers for a faulty design and the trainers for a failure of imagination. Plan accordingly.</p><p>I was once flying a BK from Savannah to Atlanta, full of fuel and at max gross weight with an isolette and baby on board. Five minutes after takeoff and adjacent to Savannah International, I got a master caution, an engine-low light, and an engine-out audio alarm. Startle effect! The N1 gauge on the left engine was at zero. But the aircraft was still flying normally! What the hell? The team couldn't hear the alarm, but they could hear me thinking out loud. "Ok! What's going on? I have a caution light and an alarm. An N1 is at zero, but the rotor is normal and the torques are matched. The TOTs are matched and normal." </p><p>I declared an emergency with Savannah, turned, and landed at the FBO. Only later did we learn that failure of an N1 gauge could provide confusing and alarming indications of an engine failure. I had to learn about this by living through it. No one had ever sat in a cockpit with me, looked me in the eye, and put their finger on that gauge while saying, "if this gauge fails, you will get indications of an engine failure, with lights and audio. But it may just be the gauge! </p><p>The Avera Mckennon pilot reported that at one point he smelled smoke and heard the sound of an engine winding down. He was headed to an airport for an emergency landing. It all worked out for him and his team, but the question as to whether or not he should have landed immediately--a normal response to a fire on board--will make for a lively discussion in classes. In any case, he was there, we weren’t and it’s easy and pointless to armchair analyze and criticize. They all lived. Well done sir.</p><p>Finally, the idea that perhaps initially doing nothing in response to confusing cockpit indications in an emergency situation and simply landing is no justification to avoid putting forth effort to fully understand your aircraft and its systems and be as familiar as possible with the limitations and published emergency procedures. Indeed, understanding that an aircraft’s indicators could confuse you is all the more reason to gather up every single bit of information you can about your machine. Study the mishaps. Read the reports. Learn from history and imagine it happening to you. Because it very well might and you need, no—scratch that--you must be ready. You must not end up in an NTSB report. </p><p>Tonight’s the night! </p><div><br /></div>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-39752827247479275092023-10-28T07:36:00.001-07:002023-10-28T07:40:21.397-07:00THE RIGHT STUFF<p><br /></p><p><i>(This article originally appeared as a safety column submission in Vertical Valor/911. I reshare it here in the hope that it may offer some benefit to the HEMS industry. DCF)</i></p><p>The thing that makes safety somewhat—well—boring, is that it is the absence of occurrence. We devote time, effort, and money in order to make something not happen. To keep us motivated and focused on this goal, it helps to remember the overwhelming sensations of disappointment and sorrow that follow a catastrophic mishap; one in which an aircraft is destroyed and people you know are killed. </p><p>Use these memories to keep yourself mindful. Maintain a preoccupation with failure, because such a preoccupation is one of the hallmarks of a highly reliable company, team, or person. While sentinel events often involve death and destruction; occasionally, thank goodness, we are confronted with a story in which people rise up above an exceedingly dire situation and pull victory from the jaws of defeat. They never give up trying to turn an in extremis situation into something survivable. These stories, and the events which spawn them, are the stuff of legend. When we read these stories we learn about people possessed of “The Right Stuff.” </p><p>As I am officially old, and my cultural references are dated, I will point out that author Tom Wolfe wrote a book with that title in 1979. It was about the first astronauts that America put into space on rockets, and, as well, those who went to the edge of space in rocket-powered winged-aircraft. The story was made into a fantastic movie--if you haven’t seen it you have something to look forward to. </p><p>There is a scene in this film in which Chuck Yeager, the first person to fly faster than the speed of sound and live to talk about it, is testing a high-performance jet aircraft which, in the dispassionate and clinical language of an accident investigator, “departs controlled flight.” I hope you never have to experience an aircraft departing controlled flight, because at that point you are basically along for the last ride of your life. </p><p>Unless…</p><p>Unless you can somehow wrest control of the situation and regain authority over your aircraft. Often you can’t, which is why several fighter pilots over the years have taken advantage of the seats made by the company founded by James Martin and Valentine Baker and ejected from aircraft that have experienced a departure from controlled flight. Yeager does this in the book and the film. There’s a reason he’s a hero and it goes beyond breaking the sound barrier.</p><p>Helicopters don’t come with ejection seats. When a helicopter departs controlled flight, such as is described in the NTSB’s recent preliminary accident report about an EC-135 that crashed in Pennsylvania in January of this year, the only option available to pilot and team is to stay with it and keep trying.</p><p>By all accounts, that is what the pilot of this aircraft did. Thanks to eyewitness reports and doorbell cameras(?!?) we can, in our imagination, ride along on this flight which was unremarkable right up until the instant when the helicopter went “BANG” and rolled right out of control. According to the flight team in the back, it went inverted—maybe more than once. They were pinned to the ceiling. </p><p>The pilot never gave up. And he got it right side up and in a nose-up decelerating attitude just before planting it in the one clear spot available to him that didn’t involve hurting anyone on the ground. He dodged wires and houses and a church and the people in it. </p><p>He displayed “The Right Stuff.” </p><p>After the crash, the flight team demonstrated that they too have the right stuff. The NTSB report states, “Following the accident, the flight nurse evacuated the patient then evacuated the pilot while the medic shut down both engines. The nurse travelled with the patient while the medic travelled with the pilot to area hospitals.” (Do the people you fly with know how to shut down the engines on your aircraft?) The photo of that evacuation—of that nurse climbing from the wreckage of that helicopter, baby in arms--will be iconic, like the picture of a child in the arms of Oklahoma City Firefighter Chris Fields after the bombing there, and other images of rescuers and the rescued from 9/11. These images restore our faith in humanity and remind us which way is up. </p><p><a href="https://nypost.com/2022/01/18/pilot-of-miracle-philly-medical-helicopter-crash-speaks-out/" target="_blank">click here to see image</a><br /></p><p>Nice work, team. </p><p>This legendary helicopter story will go down in the annals of aviation history, right up there with Sully Sullenberger and the Miracle on the Hudson, Al Haynes and United Flight 232 in Sioux City Iowa, and Captain Richard Champion de Crespigny and Qantas Flight 32 in Singapore. In each of these cases the aircraft came apart and the crew kept it together. </p><p>It’s good to read these stories and talk about them. In your imagination, put yourself into that crew’s position. Aircraft are extremely reliable, and you might go through an entire flying career without ever having an engine failure or other significant mechanical problem. And then again, they do happen and it might happen to you. The fact that you have thousands of accident and incident-free hours does not preclude a big bang on your next flight. As John Jordon says in the HAI video Autorotations: Reality Exposed, “every time I fly, I tell myself, today’s the day!” </p><p>When your time comes, (and you should decide right now that it will) you must try to avoid being startled. The best way to do this is to expect trouble. By studying events like the Duke Life Flight crash—which didn’t end well--and this more recent event which did (a destroyed helicopter notwithstanding), you can increase your own mindfulness. You can nurture your preoccupation with failure and work against the probability of that failure killing you. You too can possess The Right Stuff.</p><div><br /></div>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-52670303542510027782023-10-28T07:21:00.002-07:002023-10-28T07:22:08.445-07:00Anticipation!<p> <i>(This article originally appeared as a safety column submission in Vertical Valor/911. I reshare it here in the hope that it may offer some benefit to the HEMS industry. DCF)</i></p><p>The first two lines of the old Carly Simon song “Anticipation” go like this, </p><p><i>“We can never know about the days to come.</i></p><p><i>But we think about them anyway”</i></p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBD6wJ8kKQ_YnsbAJPOUGIuMlQFlQ93Vx68gc15FWCus8vC1HDW8MhNB9wZ9jr55VFe0RaylH_p1ROVyIPgZQeM2YdCcXky-mfji3dM0BVNXjMJ7TLHTjoKdkHd_MJ_nk37WDS3jc0ZchNGCstMwGrayllRTk9kKztW49F88HMiv-hnxXRGR1q65fpKd0/s1200/joshshot.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><i><img border="0" data-original-height="582" data-original-width="1200" height="194" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBD6wJ8kKQ_YnsbAJPOUGIuMlQFlQ93Vx68gc15FWCus8vC1HDW8MhNB9wZ9jr55VFe0RaylH_p1ROVyIPgZQeM2YdCcXky-mfji3dM0BVNXjMJ7TLHTjoKdkHd_MJ_nk37WDS3jc0ZchNGCstMwGrayllRTk9kKztW49F88HMiv-hnxXRGR1q65fpKd0/w400-h194/joshshot.jpg" width="400" /></i></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>Image courtesy Josh Henke</i></td></tr></tbody></table><p>After writing a column in this space on highly reliable organizations, I was discussing high-reliability with another safety-advocate recently. We talked about the importance of “anticipation.” In any high-risk high-consequence endeavor, it pays to anticipate. As well, it’s good to focus on the attributes of high reliability, one of which is “a preoccupation with failure.” If we take it for granted that people will make mistakes; then our next step is to anticipate where and when those mistakes might occur, and devise “safety-nets” to trap the error and lessen or eliminate the ill-effects.</p><p>I recently reconsidered a purposeful behavior that I blogged about long ago, “the objective continuous risk assessment process.” (O-Crap). You continuously and objectively consider the proximate threat to your safety while flying. You discuss this threat and you formulate a tactic, technique, or procedure to deal with it. What’s going to kill me right now and what am I doing to prevent that from happening?</p><p>I am a proponent of helicopters having instrument-flight-rules capability. Even singles. I think we spend enough time flying in marginal weather and at low altitudes to warrant the extra expense that IFR entails. But IFR comes with its own pitfalls, which we should anticipate. </p><p>Sit back and ask yourself, “when is an IFR pilot most likely to encounter problems?” Perhaps you, like me, come to the conclusion that the end of an IFR approach in O-Crap weather could be the time and place when things get wooly. </p><p>At the bottom of the approach, the pilot is understandably interested in breaking out of the weather, seeing the surface, and landing the helicopter. She might continue for a few seconds if she can’t see the ground at the decision point, and she also might drop a few feet lower than the published decision or minimum descent altitude. She might slow the aircraft to expand the time available to react to an opening. Doing these things is human-nature, and this natural tendency has to be aggressively trained out of us IFR pilots. Anticipation and a preoccupation with failure will help justify a training budget that enables the training that prevents misfortune. We don’t train until we can do it right – we train until we can’t do it wrong. Anything less is disaster in the making.</p><p>The mind-set of an IFR pilot should be, “I am not going to break out, even though the reported weather at the beginning of the approach points to that happening. I am not going to break out and I am going to perform the missed approach as published. And it’s going to be the best missed approach ever! I will anticipate problems and have my hands and feet ready to take control of this aircraft if need be, because there isn’t much room for error at the bottom. If the aircraft has a tendency to get squirrelly at low speeds I will keep my speed up. I will maintain my scan and fly this aircraft on instruments, and if we do break out in the clear I will be pleasantly surprised.” As a young army instrument pilot I flew 20 hours a year in a UH-1 “Huey” simulator. It had no visuals and no stabilization. Every approach was followed by the missed approach procedure. That was very good training.</p><p>Here’s an excerpt from an accident report,</p><p>“During the instrument approach to the destination airport, the weather conditions deteriorated. The pilot was using the helicopter's autopilot to fly the GPS approach to the airport, and the pilot and the medical crew reported normal helicopter operations. Upon reaching the GPS approach minimum descent altitude, the pilot was unable to see the airport and executed a go-around. The pilot reported that, after initiating the go-around, he attempted to counteract, with right cyclic input, an un-commanded sharp left 45° bank. Recorded flight data revealed that the helicopter climbed and made a progressive right bank that reached 50°. The helicopter descended as the right bank continued, and the airspeed increased until the helicopter impacted treetops…” What we had here was a failure to anticipate.</p><p>During my travels to present Air Medical Resource Management training, I hear and tell stories. I tell on myself. Some of my stories are embarrassing; how could I have been so dumb? But I would rather be embarrassed and hopefully make a life-saving impression on some young man or woman than shelter my ego and perhaps read about how they died in a helicopter crash. Stories can save lives. </p><p><i>The pilot was performing an instrument approach in dark night IMC conditions. At the missed approach point, he wanted the weather to continue. He wished it so – even though it was not. He did not initiate the missed approach procedure and continued toward the destination, partly on his instruments and partly by looking out the wind screen. He became disoriented and got lost in the goo. While struggling to maintain control of the helicopter and reorient himself he latched onto a patch of good visibility – a “sucker-hole” - that enabled him to get the aircraft down near the ground. </i></p><p><i>The team members on board were understandably upset when they realized that they were at ground level right next to the multi-story hospital building, and that the helipad they were supposed to be approaching was on a roof-top several stories above them, in the clouds. </i>This is a true story. </p><p>So what do you think happened here? I think a good guy with good intentions – a normally safe and conscientious pilot – made a snap wrong decision at the decision point. </p><p>“It’s almost good enough. Let’s keep going and hope it gets better.” </p><p>It doesn’t matter what we want, it doesn’t matter how hard we wish, it’s straight-up no-kidding what you see is what you get. The training-imperative must be “fly according to the environment.” Our response must be conditioned, and that conditioning takes time-in-training and anticipation.</p><p>Our simulator-training scenarios should be tricky, the way life is, to engender thought and discussion. You can learn almost as much sitting at a table and discussing a flight after the fact as you can while performing one. And it is during calm thoughtful discussions of what actually happened versus what should have happened that values and norms and ingrained behaviors are written into our psyche.</p><p>As Carly Simon sang, “I'm no prophet and I don't know nature's ways” but I do know that we should try our best to anticipate human nature, and train for it. </p><div><br /></div>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-63166958968374580972023-10-28T06:56:00.002-07:002023-10-28T07:01:21.325-07:00 All the Kings Horses and All the Kings Men…<p><br /></p><p><i>(This article originally appeared as a safety column submission in Vertical Valor/911. I reshare it here in the hope that it may offer some benefit to the HEMS industry. DCF)</i></p><p><i><b>Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall,</b></i></p><p><i><b>Humpty Dumpty had a great fall.</b></i></p><p><i><b>All the king's horses and all the king's men</b></i></p><p><i><b>Couldn't put Humpty together again.</b></i></p><p><i><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi0pYzQ8JWfU_scyugrJit32cE-iT_YhdyKqVFGvcXbbHeDsSl-Pxsgb0dYulDJv_hlZh7kqybtN861eTvjuKu61hCVcu5wo7asVuaCxY4s9h9H2NYkgrGyJN2ko4Wu97_rcKc27HNFWKpIA9UDAOftNMef79115HzhancxETN6fwjqjJ5h8XGcTjc1GAI/s600/skjetcrash%20(1).jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="486" data-original-width="600" height="259" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi0pYzQ8JWfU_scyugrJit32cE-iT_YhdyKqVFGvcXbbHeDsSl-Pxsgb0dYulDJv_hlZh7kqybtN861eTvjuKu61hCVcu5wo7asVuaCxY4s9h9H2NYkgrGyJN2ko4Wu97_rcKc27HNFWKpIA9UDAOftNMef79115HzhancxETN6fwjqjJ5h8XGcTjc1GAI/s320/skjetcrash%20(1).jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">People just like us died here. Ask yourself, <br />"what were they thinking?"</td></tr></tbody></table><br /></i></p><p>My friend Marcus called it. We sat at the NEMSPA booth at the Heli-Expo trade show, and as I discussed our near year-long stretch of fatality-free helicopter-emergency-medical services flying, he said, "you know Dan, there will be more fatal crashes, you know that, right?"</p><p>Sadly, he was to be proven right.</p><p>But why? Why must we take it for granted that some number of us will be killed each year? Why can't we emulate Delta, or American, or any other large air carrier? They haven't killed a passenger or crew in a long time. What is it that they do that we don't? </p><p>Is it their equipment? Is it their training? Is it because they have two pilots and we in HEMS overwhelmingly have one? I don't think so. I think the reason the larger airlines are so safe is due to how their pilots think. They think and act like "airline pilots." They make decisions based upon sound operating principles, with an ever-present eye towards safety. The mindset of the pilots and the safety culture of an airline is understandable. When they crash they kill a lot of people. Not one, or two, or four. A whole lot.</p><p>When Colgan Air, a smaller airline, crashed on February 12, 2009, forty-nine people lost their lives. Including the two pilots who were determined to be suffering from fatigue and a lack of proficiency. That sentinel event rippled throughout the air travel industry and caused major changes to operating procedures, standards, and experience requirements. Ask any chief pilot or director of operations, the Colgan crash changed the paradigm.</p><p>When airline pilots are found to not be thinking and acting like "airline pilots," then, by golly or by government, something gets done. I suspect that most of our crashes in HEMS occur because too many of us fail to behave like our CFR Part 121 brethren. We helicopter pilots tend to be rugged individualists.</p><p>We have gotten where we are in life because of our own effort and determination. We resist anyone's attempt to change us. After all, what we have been doing has worked so far, right? Why would we ever need to change our behavior? When I start to think I have all the answers, I page back through my memories to all of my dumb mistakes and near misses, and I ask myself – what should I have done differently? </p><p>A friend of mine, with whom I used to fly the line, left HEMS and began to fly in the utility sector. One day he was ferrying an aircraft in the southeast U.S. He landed in a field for weather, then made the decision to take back off. And pretty quickly he was dead from crashing into a river in bad weather. Another friend made a willful and conscious decision to fly into an area of storms after discussing these storms with another pilot and being offered a safe place to spend the night. He and his crew are dead. Another pilot elected to dispense with the sort of pre-takeoff challenge and response confirmation checks that help us make sure our aircraft is properly configured for flight. He had a switch set wrong on takeoff. He is dead too. </p><p>You can't undo dead.</p><p>I can't tell you how many times I have seen a pilot perform an aggressive "top gun" takeoff. And maybe I have done one or two of them myself. Delta doesn't do that. I was at the Caraway Hospital base in Alabama once, and I watched a pilot repositioning for fuel roll a 206 all the way over onto its side. Sure, he looked cool, but if that motor had quit during that showing-off stunt, he would be another Humpty Dumpty.</p><p>The common denominator with all of these pilots? They weren't thinking like airline pilots.</p><p>They weren't making choices the way an airline pilot would. In HEMS, we pilots and crews operate far away from the flagpole, from headquarters, from oversight. (OCCs notwithstanding) And we make lots of choices that have unbelievably severe repercussions. The altitude we fly at, the fuel reserve we operate with, the weather and winds we proceed into, the places we land and depart from and the manner in which we make those landings and departures; these decisions are super-important, and we should make them with one thing in mind. </p><p>"We will not crash and kill ourselves today."</p><p>That's how professional airline pilots think. And no matter whether we carry four or forty-nine, that's how we should think as well. Because some actions can't be undone. Some choices are forever. As we operate, perhaps we should ask ourselves; "would a professional airline pilot make this choice?" If not maybe we should take a more conservative path. </p><p>As we are out there on our own, we should never accept an undue risk because we think – or worry – that our peers would do it. And if we take pride in pressing on when “the other guys would have turned back,” maybe we should remember that pride goes before destruction. When its crunch time and you are wondering if the other pilots would do something, remember - they are not sitting there in your seat. You are. The safety of your crew and passengers trumps every other consideration. </p><p>As we make choices, we should listen to that small still voice inside. That voice is there for a reason. Our ancestors who ignored it became some carnivore’s dinner. They no longer swim in the gene pool. We should make up our minds to be as safe as an airline pilot. If you find yourself wondering if something is a bad idea - it probably is. At the very least, avail yourself of one of the benefits a two-pilot crew has, the chance to bounce something off of another aviation professional. Call another ship, or your OCC if you have one, or even your next level of aviation management. Don't be afraid to ask for input. It makes you look wise and professional. </p><p>Like an airline pilot.</p><p><br /></p>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-75927376326086750712023-10-28T05:23:00.003-07:002023-10-28T05:23:48.887-07:00 Getting Less Bang for Your Buck<p><br /></p><p><i>(This article originally appeared as a safety column submission in Vertical Valor/911. I reshare it here in the hope that it may offer some benefit to the HEMS industry. DCF)</i></p><p>It must be tough to be the director of operations or chief pilot of a helicopter company. My old friend and mentor Clark Kurschner, who was a long-time D.O. for Omniflight Helicopters and extremely Yoda-like; told me once that playing beach-volleyball was his only escape from stress and worry. These positions within a certificate-holding aviation company are required by regulation – for good reason. The gravity-like pull towards lower costs and greater profits could easily lead to a culture of cutting corners – the D.O. and C.P. have to stand up and hold the line for safety. To provide the training required by federal, state and even local rules is very expensive. Any company that can cut costs has a leg-up on the competition for contracts and resources. One of the easiest places to cut corners is in the realm of training, and someone with a business background may not understand how important training is. They also may not fully understand this axiom of human behavior: experience drives attitude and attitude drives action when no one is looking.</p><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiRIxgh3wD05QHLg9ymj5OqbNFoZB2e7cVUgfGytiSyG9SC6LgalRVUURJWp-dm0RD3hHPUdfpXJolwjTOrUewn1WyCJym6ewupfo7DABeFChP2vdH19pIfxjePkPWWg1i-fVpYhNIXDetxCMfG7wfSVQVQAE6aI8L1nyWGiZ7NMHGRWrfP9KTSBhaiL-U/s960/35488046_1716077708470582_3178997031423180800_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="960" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiRIxgh3wD05QHLg9ymj5OqbNFoZB2e7cVUgfGytiSyG9SC6LgalRVUURJWp-dm0RD3hHPUdfpXJolwjTOrUewn1WyCJym6ewupfo7DABeFChP2vdH19pIfxjePkPWWg1i-fVpYhNIXDetxCMfG7wfSVQVQAE6aI8L1nyWGiZ7NMHGRWrfP9KTSBhaiL-U/s320/35488046_1716077708470582_3178997031423180800_n.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Image courtesy Mercy Flight Central, where the author <br />has presented CRM training twice.</td></tr></tbody></table><p>While preparing for a leadership job in 2004, I learned that South Carolina demanded an EMS helicopter pilot have 25 hours of pilot-in-command flight experience in the “make and model” of any helicopter they would be flying within the state. </p><p>We were going to operate a Bell 230 and a Bell 206 and were looking at having to fly a tremendous number of “non-revenue” hours. I called the state’s division of health and environmental control and asked where that rule came from. The state’s guy had no idea so I wrote a letter asking for relief from that rule so that we might more quickly offer life-saving services to the state’s citizenry. I mean, after all, it would have been a shame to have some kid’s mom bleed out on the side of I-26 while we were out chopping holes in the sky to satisfy a requirement that exceeded anything the FAA or other state in our region required. </p><p>We got the hours required down to 15 per pilot per machine, and saved the direct-operating-costs of a few hundred flight hours. None of the six of us pilots ever crashed because of the hour-reduction South Carolina permitted us. In fact, in the majority of instances when a pilot crashes an aircraft it has nothing to do with their flight experience or technical proficiency. It most often comes down to how pilots “feel” about the situation they find themselves in. Even in the instances of death by lack of skill, the situation that required the demonstration of a skill that was lacking was most-often created by “attitude.” Attitude is a non-rational mix of behavioral inputs from the cognitive and emotional components of our personalities. And to be sure – “the way we do things around here” drives attitude as well. As it turns out, many pilots (and business executives) are loathe to delve into the touchy-feely world of feelings and attitudes. As a retired Delta pilot with whom I was recently sharing beers said, “That stuff don’t matter!” Taking nothing away from our conversation and sharing of flying-lies, and his cold beer: I disagree. I believe to the extent that we can affect attitudes; we can shape “hearts and minds,” we can stop helicopter pilots from crashing helicopters. And right after a crash is when it must really suck to be a D.O. or C.P.</p><p>As you prepare a training plan and budget for the pilots you employ, consider that the technical skills you seek to instill, reinforce, or verify in your team – while extremely important – are very likely not going to be what prevents you from having to explain why your helicopter crashed and left dead bodies on the ground. While you must comply with what the “rules” require, and such compliance is very expensive, the good news is that shaping attitudes has zero direct-operating costs and you will never bang up a helicopter providing touchy-feely training – or as the FAA calls it, “Soft Skills Training.”</p><p>So where do you start? Well, first of all, if you aren’t familiar with Crew Resource Management Training, open up your mind and get with google. Learn the basics; what works and what doesn’t. Seek to understand group-dynamics, the power of social-settings, and the influence of charismatic leadership. Know that the relationship between CRM “facilitation” and attitudinal-change is elastic. </p><p>If you tell me that the way I feel about something is wrong – even if you show me evidence and examples and valid information, I may well refute and refuse your efforts. And then, over time, I may come to see things differently – and that’s what you want! We don’t want a pilot to simply recite safety and success, we want a pilot to live and breathe safety and success - in the interest of living and breathing. Make no mistake – safety and success are irrevocably linked – without one there will be less of the other.</p><p>CRM “facilitators” don’t try and tell others how to feel – facilitators let others evolve their own feelings at their own pace, because that’s the only way it happens. I use the terms facilitator and instructor interchangeably, because a good one will seamlessly switch from one role to the other during a session -as the situation, level of understanding, and personalities demand. </p><p>You probably have people in your company who would be great CRM instructors, and they may or may not be pilots from your flight-standards section. They may not even be pilots! My friend Randy Mains conducts CRM instructor training courses several times a year. His week-long preparation for the job is excellent – especially for someone unaccustomed to standing up and delivering to a group. Randy employs the crawl-walk-run style of learning, and it works magnificently.</p><p>I know this because after being a CRM instructor myself for several years I went and spent a week with him and several other students. I was part of the group-dynamic. I was influenced by the social-setting. And I experienced charismatic leadership as displayed by two young women just starting their careers as pilots. I influenced them, and they influenced me and we were all better for it. Sami and Grace will doubtlessly make our industry more safe and successful thanks to their dedication to CRM principles. </p><p>So could you. Step right up…</p><p><br /></p>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-64322379106385900402020-08-24T11:59:00.002-07:002021-06-22T05:07:02.022-07:00A Flight Paramedic Writes...<p>"Coffee Talk.....or in my case Beer Talk..... Real talk for a moment and this is gonna be long so if you give zero fox or don’t have the attention span then keep scrolling, no judgment. This is just something we all need to remember, especially right now. </p><p>My husband took me out to lunch today to one of our favorite spots for a burger and beer because he felt like doing something sweet for me. Not because he wants something from me but because I have been making an extra effort to be and do sweet things for him like making his favorite soup, getting him a Happy Day gift, and just being all around more affectionate. We talked about things we wanted for the future and plans we wanted to start working towards, which was nice and something we haven’t done in a while. </p><p>For me, it’s hard to be vulnerable and show emotion even to my kids and my spouse. Working in public safety for so long, especially being brought up in older school public safety, you learn early that you have to compartmentalize and show no emotion....especially being a female in a predominately male field. It is drilled into you. You have to be able to turn off emotion to work efficiently in times when you see things no human being should ever have to see. You have to be better, work harder and be stronger. Working like this establishes you as a paramedic and not just a “female”, as well as preserves your mental state enough to be able to continue working. </p><p>What you don’t realize early on though, is that this will bleed over into your personal life as well. You become closed off, reserved, and quiet. It gets harder to show emotion on your days off, and harder not imagine all the ways things could “go wrong” in any given recreational situation. It gets harder to turn off your “public servant” brain and turn on your “human brain”. Being a manager/supervisor/leader makes it that much harder because you have to be the strong one people can come to, trust, and rely on amongst all the other factors this profession already entails. In my work life, I strive to be the mom/big sister figure that my people can come to knowing that it will be without judgement but also that hard truths will be told if need be. I try to always greet my people with a smile, try to make them laugh when appropriate and be strong for them when they need me to be. </p><p>I am also human, and what most people don’t see is the tears that I shed for them, our patients and sometimes myself. I have had my moments sobbing in the bathtub or screaming at the night air by myself. I suffer from depression, anxiety, self harm and PTSD not just from public safety but from other factors of my life as well. (Whoo that’s not easy to say out loud!) I have to remind myself that it’s ok to be emotional and show emotion at the appropriate time. </p><p>We have to constantly work on ourselves not to get lost in the “this is just who I am now” mindset and remind ourselves to be outwardly vulnerable, sweet, loving and kind to the people that we love and care about. Luckily I have a partner that not only understands because he’s been there, but reminds me to be Jennifer and not just the paramedic or the supervisor when I get lost in it. It’s so important to be cognizant of yourself and see when you need to remind yourself to be you again. </p><p>I have overcome a lot in this profession, from being a single mom going through paramedic school on an EMT Basic salary to being sexually assaulted more than once on duty, to having my reputation trashed for reporting one of those assaults, to having my superiors protect my assailant before me, to being told I couldn’t do it cause I wasn’t a man, to being held back from promotion for standing up for what’s right, to being told I got as far as I did only because I was pretty, to being told I will never make it in this career, to now....a 17 year veteran, a flight paramedic, being promoted to my current level after less than two years at my current job, to now out ranking that same person who tried to hold me back from that previous promotion. </p><p>I did this while being a mother to my kids and a wife my husband can be proud of. It’s hard, it really is. I work at it every day. Some days I fail but others I surprise even myself and prevail. It’s up to you to be happy and make your life what you want it to be. It’s up to you to remember who you are and to work everyday at being the person you want to be.</p><p>“I hope you remember that if you encounter an obstacle in the road, don’t think of it as an obstacle at all....think of it as a challenge to find a new path on the road less traveled.”</p><p>Thanks for coming to my Ted Talk. You may now rejoin your regularly scheduled scrolling. 🤣✌🏼"</p><p><br /></p><p>To this we say, Thanks, Jennifer for opening up and sharing your thoughts. There might very well be some young person struggling--right this instant--with the exact issues you discuss, and we hope they derive comfort and strength from this.</p><p><br /></p><p>Thanks for everything you do, every day. </p><p><br /></p><p>HelicopterEMS.com</p>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-35083736769451874112020-06-17T08:08:00.000-07:002020-06-17T08:27:29.159-07:00Guidance From Above...<h3 style="text-align: center;">
<i>Dan , I’m 48 years old. I’ve flown in excess of 10,000 hours. His arm still rests behind my back on every flight.</i></h3>
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<br />
Last week, I had an epiphany. As an Air Medical Resource Management instructor for the last ten years, I have been putting out information about a well-defined hazardous attitude threatening the human-variety of pilot since manned-flight began.<br />
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"Impulsivity."<br />
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My standard spiel revolves around the threat of an impulsive response to a suddenly-developing problem. Say one of your two engines catches on fire, and you see a fire-light in the cockpit. You exclaim, "crap, we gotta fire on two!" and you reach forward and smartly pull the number one engine's fire-control handle and shut that engine's fuel valve. Now you have two problems instead of one. It's happened more than once.<br />
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Acting on impulse in an emergency situation often makes a bad situation much much worse. Better to announce what you think is happening, take a deep breath, and devise (and announce) a response. "I'm looking at a fire light on the number two engine. Crew, prepare for an emergency landing and tell me if you see any other indications of us being on fire. I am going to slow down to single engine speed and put my hand on the number two fire control handle. I've confirmed the light and the handle. You see smoke. I'm pulling it."<br />
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So that's one type of threat from acting on impulse, and an example of how to fight that urge. But there's another threat of acting on impulse. Consider a beautiful day and a perfectly operating helicopter and a pilot who has an impulse to "have a little fun." This type of impulse has killed a crowd of crews too. In our industry, the most recent event took place in the Superstition Mountains. The Air Force suffered a famous and now iconic tragedy involving a B-52. And then they lost a C-17. It happens. We have to be on the lookout for it. Within ourselves and each other. Impulsivity, in any form, is bad.<br />
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So I sat down and wrote the next "Focus on Safety" column for Vertical Valor Magazine. I titled it "Neither Willful Nor Thrillful Be." And as I sometimes do with a draft, I sent it to a friend to review. This one went to Miles Dunagan, HEMS pilot and president of the National EMS Pilots Association. He's a good sounding board.<br />
<br />
He wrote back.<br />
<br />
"Hi Dan,<br />
<br />
It’s always Great to hear from you!<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiCnEuGriVe5BH4HdIE_m8gqJ9NpddDcLcSyLMUmJaOvNXRHBWrsjZcwInimdcjde_iBeUsOTsoJnkvKVlre0iMgto-LiNg-_7Kdx4uPM-M5mRt61SYahuu1yrxtDDJ0rbpKO3Zm_Dxd8k/s1600/miles%2527+dad+flying+hems+in+the+seventies.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="740" data-original-width="1600" height="183" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiCnEuGriVe5BH4HdIE_m8gqJ9NpddDcLcSyLMUmJaOvNXRHBWrsjZcwInimdcjde_iBeUsOTsoJnkvKVlre0iMgto-LiNg-_7Kdx4uPM-M5mRt61SYahuu1yrxtDDJ0rbpKO3Zm_Dxd8k/s400/miles%2527+dad+flying+hems+in+the+seventies.png" width="400" /></a>I like it. I believe it is prevalent. I’m afraid it will always be in our business. While reading, my thoughts went directly to my pals I’ve lost. None were seeking a thrill, but their desire to achieve an outcome took them farther into the danger zone where we allow our judgment to--not necessarily be absent--but perhaps just slow to surface when we face hazards that were unexpected.<br />
<br />
My dad and I talked about it. Of course this was before the dementia took so much from him. (Hard to believe he’s been gone a year)I simply asked him.”Dad how did y’all do it back in 1970-71?”. What were your minimums? His response, “we really didn’t have any son”. Then how did you do it I asked? He shrugged his shoulders and talked about that feeling when your hair on the back of your head starts to stick up, it’s time to turn around. I said Dad, that’s too late! He admitted that I was correct, and that he was lucky. We’ve came a long way, but that desire to produce good outcomes was powerful in 1970, and still is 50 years later.<br />
<br />
The desire for the thrill can be overwhelming. I remember being a young pilot. I remember flying with my dad during those mid teens in an Astar. When I got my private, my dad let me swap to the right seat and he went in the left. We had the high back seats. My dad would put his right arm on the back of my chair. Kind like an arm rest. During these informative years, my dad watched me like a hawk. As these were often empty legs, I remember many times setting up for a departure. I would climb out and get set up for cruise and now we’re getting somewhere. Then , it seemed like my weakest suit was setting up for our approach for landing. I would make my turn around the LZ, assess winds, look for wires, and here we go. Dad had been instructing since the 60s. He was pretty good. He would let me make mistakes. He would allow me to get set up and start my approach. I would be lined up for what I judged as the perfect approach path and then it would happen. That right arm that was resting on the back of my chair would come to life and he would pop me on the back of my head. I would execute a go around and he would ask me 'what was wrong with that approach son?' I would look and see a pole (wire) that I had missed because I got in a hurry and was careless. Or I would re-assess the wind and realize I had lined up down wind. Believe it or not, these are great memories. I can’t help but tear up remember them.<br />
<br />
Dan , I’m 48 years old. I’ve flown in excess of 10,000 hours. My dad's arm still rests behind my back on every flight. It makes me take an extra look. It makes me review a chart one more time. It motivates me to ask questions as we are circling a scene or a pad I’ve landed at countless times.<br />
<br />
I can relate to your story of being thrillful my friend. Something tells me that the Blackhawk pilot who thought enough of you to expose your shortcoming in judgement before that Black Cat departure all those years ago was riding with you from that day forward. (added: yep!)<br />
<br />
All this doesn’t mean we’ve never made mistakes flying. It just means we've had a little different perspective than those who let bravado and macho attitudes creep into the cockpit with them...<br />
<br />
Sorry to ramble my friend.<br />
<br />
Thanks for sharing.<br />
<br />
Very Respectfully,<br />
<br />
Miles<br />
#everybodygoeshomehaa"<br />
<br />
About Miles Dunagan's dad...<br />
<br />
"Dad was one of the original 6 pilots to start the Memphis Police Aviation unit in 1969. He flew full time, then later as a reserve. He held an ATP and was a DPE for 14 years."<br />
<br />
In the Army, we call a guy like that "the long pole in the tent." Today, he has been gone a year. May God continue to bless Mr. Dunagan's soul and comfort his son Miles Dunagan<br />
<br />
HelicopterEMS.com<br />
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Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-47097158837057761802019-04-08T08:39:00.002-07:002019-04-08T10:32:46.068-07:00Learn How To Fail Brilliantly!By: Josh Henke, RN, BSN, CEN, CFRN, CCRN, Georgetown University.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><img alt="Image result for Intubation in a helicopter" height="300" src="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DXBw-tmVMAEN-mh.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" width="400" /></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Image courtesy Sydney HEMS. </td></tr>
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<br />
Aviation and medicine have long-complimented each other. Checklists are the first thing that comes to mind when thinking of this. The airline industry helped to revolutionize the medical industry with the system-wide adoption of checklists, and the acceptance of resource-management. I challenge you to find an O.R. that does not follow a checklist prior to making the first cut. (Hint: you won’t)<br />
<br />
I was reminded of the similarities between aviation and medicine the other day while talking to a non-flying, never-intubated-anyone peer. He was asking me about RSI and all of the stuff that goes along with it. I could hear the tension in his voice as he was thinking of himself in the hot-seat with a patient. Just the thought of dropping a difficult tube can get a medical provider in a tizzy, with or without a checklist. I found myself articulating something I have long held dear;<br />
<br />
Learn how to fail brilliantly. Be the best at failing.<br />
<br />
This might sound odd, but hear me out. We are all going to miss tubes. Anyone that tells you they never missed a tube is lying. We all have or will miss that airway, and its how we fail that determines the patient's outcome. The planning for failure; being brilliant with your back-up plan assures that WHEN stuff DOES go south, you are the best at re-acclimating and implementing a solution. I also like the phrase “you can BLS someone all the way to Texas if you’re good at it!”<br />
<br />
In the air medical world, failure carries a higher price. But, failures do happen. Engines quit, wheels don’t deploy, blades can go rapidly south. My advice is - even in this case - know how to fail brilliantly. You can have the best pilot in the world, but even he can’t make a helicopter NOT FAIL despite his many years of flying-experience.<br />
<br />
I challenge you to think about this; how might your operation fail? And how can you be brilliant when it does?<br />
Who is designated to make radio call outs in the event of an emergency?<br />
Are you allowed to put the gear down?<br />
Do you, in the left seat, spend time looking for appropriate LZs in case sh!t happens in a hurry?<br />
<br />
Take some time and think about how you plan for failed-airways and apply that to your air operations. Checklists have pervaded the medical industry and made it a better place. Can we use the lessons learned in critical-care medicine to do the same for aviation?<br />
<br />
Are you willing to be part of that success-story? As my pilot-friend Dan Foulds says, “You are not a passenger! Learn as much as you can about aviation as fast as you can and be a contributing- member of your flight-team!"<br />
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Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-7029763212745776852019-01-30T05:53:00.002-08:002019-01-30T06:03:43.801-08:00It Can Happen to You Too...It was bound to happen. As women entered the ranks of HEMS pilots, it was only a matter of time until misfortune struck one of them as it has so many men sitting at the controls.<br />
<br />
It seems no one gets a pass. <i>Take note, this could happen to you too.</i> Are you doing everything possible to mitigate risk as you fly sick people?<br />
<br />
For now, let's keep the families of these victims in our thoughts. As hard as it is, let's not speculate or say things that might make terrible pain even worse. Let's let the NTSB and the FAA do their jobs.<br />
<br />
For now, let's consider these souls, and search our own.<br />
<br />
Fly safely, friends...<br />
<br />
HelicopterEMS.com<br />
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<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/SWHphKA0q-I" width="560"></iframe><br />
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<br />Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-7325761549334517252019-01-28T08:55:00.000-08:002019-01-28T09:04:05.880-08:00From our Facebook page: You! Incorporated!<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyxwo7Nf0yqw0g2wo_9FsPjRT1wFLdOU-IydL1oe5EW0KbPrVFOUDmtORFaeSwH64NZEdR2APbEfUvA3M4VZqwBN_uUo429LEGDordAjoDO3q60wCEkXZGeXsj8vQ74lAD72FknrCKAxk/s1600/me-inc-name-tage2+%25281%2529.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="454" data-original-width="600" height="302" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyxwo7Nf0yqw0g2wo_9FsPjRT1wFLdOU-IydL1oe5EW0KbPrVFOUDmtORFaeSwH64NZEdR2APbEfUvA3M4VZqwBN_uUo429LEGDordAjoDO3q60wCEkXZGeXsj8vQ74lAD72FknrCKAxk/s400/me-inc-name-tage2+%25281%2529.png" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Image courtesy Gary Christian</td></tr>
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<br />
As we begin the annual misery known as tax preparation, we are again grateful to the friend who several years ago said,<br />
<br />
"You do have an LLC, right?"<br />
<br />
Maybe you are way ahead of us on this and have been enjoying the benefits of incorporating for awhile. If so, feel free to add to the discussion with a comment. Tax wizards we aren't - but we do like to save tax dollars.<br />
<br />
Let's say you are a nurse or paramedic who occasionally teaches a class for an outside agency. Do you get a check made out to you as a contractor? If so you should incorporate.<br />
<br />
Are you a pilot who does a bit of flying for a friend. Do you speak at AMTC or a regional conference? If you get paid in any regard for occasional work that you do and are not an employee of the payor - you should incorporate.<br />
<br />
If you do two simple things you can enjoy many of the tax-saving benefits that large corporate entities do.<br />
<br />
1. Go online and visit your secretary of state and create your corporation. Several years ago, we created a "sole-proprietor" limited liability company named AMRM Training Solutions. In Georgia it's cheap - and you do not need a lawyer or legal service. You can do it yourself. We pay $50.00 per year as a for-profit. That cost is tax deductible.<br />
<br />
For Georgia visit<br />
<br />
http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/corporations<br />
<br />
If you happen to live in Michigan, you might start here<br />
<br />
https://cofs.lara.state.mi.us/…/LoginS…/ListNewFilings.aspx…<br />
<br />
2. File for a federal employer identification number. It's easy.<br />
https://www.irs.gov/…/apply-for-an-employer-identification-….<br />
<br />
If you do a gig that pays more than a few hundred dollars, the payor wants to deduct what they have paid you, so they will ask you to fill out a W-9 (it's online too). You will enter your EIN also known as your taxpayer ID number. At tax-filing time, your preparer will need the number for your return.<br />
<br />
Of special note, when you start searching for these resources, lots of sites will present themselves as your go-to resource. They cost money. You don't need to pay money to a service to do these things. Make sure you are at the state or federal website and you can do it yourself. Those guys are trying to run a scam. They have official-looking websites and send official-looking letters designed to scam you.<br />
<br />
So, what's the benefit of incorporation? Well, if you have a business and are out there generating revenue, lots of "household" costs are tax deductible. Do you have smartphones? Check. Internet service? Check. Do you drive your vehicle to a gig? Keep track of the miles because they are deductible. If you present at AMTC or ECHO, all the expenses are deductible because you are furthering the aims of your business. You are an industry expert sharing knowledge and looking for gigs. Right?<br />
Notwithstanding the audit-scare from a few years back, the room in which you bang on your computer is deductible as a home-office. But don't take our word for it - ask your tax preparer.<br />
<br />
From our perspective, this is purely for the purposes of reducing our tax burden. We write off the costs mentioned and others, and then "lose" another few thousand dollars each year. Do we "intend" to make a profit? Absolutely! And that means our corporation can continue to lose money (and allow us to pay fewer taxes) indefinitely.<br />
<br />
Here's to You, Incorporated!Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-20267030337591118002018-12-12T08:28:00.002-08:002018-12-13T06:53:40.251-08:00Event Review - Case Study: Loss of Control Due to Retreating Blade Stall<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdi9aoQjcMLnXsTOQs_PilKrPIMQYI8Ee-YW67FWMbfrX2ADi_02Jjc6_qMdoJ89E11y7q9ihEDHmtz3efLV7yvkZ5LKqyr2QIp-abqrRjn_xGdW68dE4DsEUTEoViqDN5I_5IL9b-QUg/s1600/ATST+BK+pic.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="554" data-original-width="828" height="267" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdi9aoQjcMLnXsTOQs_PilKrPIMQYI8Ee-YW67FWMbfrX2ADi_02Jjc6_qMdoJ89E11y7q9ihEDHmtz3efLV7yvkZ5LKqyr2QIp-abqrRjn_xGdW68dE4DsEUTEoViqDN5I_5IL9b-QUg/s400/ATST+BK+pic.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Image courtesy Australian Transport Safety Board</td></tr>
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<br />
About 10 years ago, I corresponded with my chief pilot at Omniflight Helicopters, Mr. Eric Pangburn, about the aircraft at my base "surging" nose-up in cruise flight. It was not a violent pitch up, rather it was a smooth and steady pitch up that was overcome with a reduction of collective and forward cyclic. It was disconcerting and I wanted to know why it was happening.<br />
<br />
The phenomenon was also experienced by another pilot at my base, Mr. Tim Lilley. Our experiences were similar and in the same aircraft, N171MU a BK-117A4. These events were not "high and hot" but occurred near sea level and moderate temps.<br />
<br />
Eric included his friend Shawn Coyle, a well-known helicopter expert, and writer, in our discussion, and Mr. Coyle added his thoughts - to wit that erosion of the leading edge of blades might reduce the margin to RBS. The answer: ease up and slow down.<br />
<br />
A pilot-friend at another base, Mr. Mike Sharp (now deceased) had experienced an RBS loss of control event prior to our events. Mike was operating a BK-117A4 N117LS and in his case, he was high, it was hot, and the aircraft was heavy. He mentioned noticing that he was near the "haze line" in the atmosphere, with clear cooler air above the level of the haze and warmer "muggier" air below. As he descended the aircraft snapped up violently - similar to the event described in the linked report from the Australian Transport Safety Board. First a pitch up to near vertical, then a flopping over to a dive straight down. The medical crew became weightless in flight and came out of their seats. (Mr. Don Lamb and Mrs. Robbin Perry)<br />
<br />
I recommend you imagine yourselves in this crews seats as you read this report. Imagine the dismay they must have felt and consider their responses, determine if you would respond in the same way or would do something differently. I also respectfully recommend that pilots avoid pitching over on the nose by way of accelerating in the dive. Since the recommended recovery for RBS is to lower the collective, lowering collective to descend should help prevent the occurrence. Mentally rehearse, prepare, and if possible prevent - this crew missed dying by a relatively small margin.<br />
<br />
I have no data to back up the following assumption, but I imagine that a BK117, EC-135, or EC-145 might be similarly susceptible to this problem because of their rotor systems. If you have experience with RBS, please share what you have learned in a comment.<br />
<br />
May you have safe flights and may you avoid a "soil-the-pants" situation.<br />
<br />
Dan Foulds<br />
HelicopterEMS.com<br />
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<i>"Shortly after 1400 Central Daylight-saving Time, a ‘violent’, uncommanded nose-up pitching of the helicopter occurred. The pilot instinctively applied full forward cyclic control, but using both hands given the severity of the pitch-up, in an attempt to regain control but was unable to arrest the continuing nose-up pitch. At about 70° nose-up the helicopter rolled left through approximately 120° and commenced a steep descent. On seeing the ground through the windscreen, the pilot applied full rearward cyclic, which resulted in the helicopter pulling out of its now near vertical nose-down attitude and levelling off at about 1,000 ft (about 800 ft above ground level)."</i><br />
<i><br /></i> <a href="https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5252918/ao-2013-030_final.pdf" target="_blank">Click here to access the Australian Transport Safety Board report.</a><br />
<i><br /></i> <i><br /></i> <i><br /></i> <i><br /></i> <i><br /></i>
Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-49335753818900690952018-11-09T07:38:00.000-08:002020-05-25T19:05:26.095-07:00Preliminary Report: Air Methods - Wisconsin - Crash Occurred April 2018. Final Report Pending. Flight Recording Device Onboard...<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><img alt="PHOTO: Three people were killed in a helicopter crash near Hazelhurst, Wis., officials said, April 26, 2018." height="240" src="https://s.abcnews.com/images/US/wisconsin-helicopter-crash-01-wsaw-jc-180427_hpMain_4x3_992.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" width="320" /></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Image courtesy WSAW</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
Update...<br />
Per the final report, it appears that the pilot fell asleep while flying. The aircraft rolled upside down and was unrecoverable....<br />
<br />
Text courtesy NTSB...<br />
<br />
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.<br />
<br />
National Transportation Safety Board<br />
Aviation Accident Preliminary Report<br />
Location: Hazelhurst, WI Accident Number: CEN18FA149<br />
Date & Time: 04/26/2018, 2250 CDT Registration: N127LN<br />
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER AS 350 B2 Injuries: 3 Fatal<br />
<br />
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Positioning<br />
<br />
On April 26, 2018, about 2250 central daylight time, a Eurocopter AS 350 B2 helicopter,<br />
N127LN, impacted trees and terrain during cruise flight near Hazelhurst, Wisconsin. The pilot<br />
and two crewmembers were fatally injured. The helicopter was destroyed during the impact.<br />
<br />
The helicopter was registered to and operated by Air Methods Corporation as a Title 14 Code of<br />
Federal Regulations Part 91 repositioning flight. Night visual meteorological conditions were<br />
reported in the area about the time of the accident, and the flight was operating on a company<br />
visual flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from the Dane County Regional Airport-<br />
Truax Field (MSN), near Madison, Wisconsin, about 2104 and was destined for the Howard<br />
Young Medical Center Heliport (60WI), near Woodruff, Wisconsin.<br />
<br />
Earlier in the day the emergency medical services (EMS) crew had transported a patient to the<br />
Madison area. The purpose of this flight was to reposition the helicopter back to 60WI. The<br />
helicopter was serviced with 80 gallons of fuel at MSN. According to initial information, the<br />
pilot radioed that he departed from MSN. The helicopter did not arrive at its destination at its<br />
estimated arrival time, and the operator started their search procedures for the helicopter. The<br />
Air Force Rescue Coordination Center placed a call to the operator and advised that an<br />
emergency locator transmitter signal associated with the helicopter was received by the center.<br />
<br />
The center informed the operator of a latitude and longitude in which to look for the helicopter.<br />
The helicopter was subsequently found near that location about 0215 on April 27, 2018.<br />
<br />
The 34-year-old pilot held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commercial pilot<br />
certificate with rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter ratings. He also held a private<br />
pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land rating. He held an FAA second class<br />
medical certificate issued on May 31, 2017. On his last application for the medical certificate<br />
the pilot reported having accumulated 3,200 hours of total flight time, with 100 hours logged<br />
with the preceding six months. According to initial information from the operator, the pilot<br />
received training on January 5 and 7, 2018 and satisfactorily passed a check ride.<br />
<br />
N127LN was a 2006 model Eurocopter (Airbus) AS 350 B2, four-place, single-engine<br />
helicopter, with serial number 4149. The helicopter was configured for EMS transport services.<br />
It was powered by a Turbomeca Arriel 1D1 turboshaft engine, with serial number 19129. The<br />
engine had a maximum takeoff power rating of 732 shaft horsepower and a continuous power<br />
<br />
Page 2 of 4 CEN18FA149<br />
<br />
rating of 625 horsepower. According to initial information, the helicopter was maintained<br />
under a company aircraft inspection program and had undergone 100 and 600-hour<br />
inspections on April 25, 2018, at an airframe total time of 5,152.8 hours. The helicopter was not<br />
equipped with a vehicle engine multifunction display or a digital electronic control unit.<br />
However, it was equipped with an enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS).<br />
<br />
<br />
At 2255, the recorded weather at the Lakeland Airport/Noble F. Lee Memorial Field, near<br />
Minocqua, Wisconsin, was: Wind calm; visibility 10 statute miles; sky condition clear;<br />
temperature 0° C; dew point -1° C; altimeter 29.88 inches of mercury.<br />
At 2253, the recorded weather at the Rhinelander-Oneida County Airport, near Rhinelander,<br />
Wisconsin, was: Wind calm; visibility 10 statute miles; sky condition clear; temperature 2° C;<br />
dew point 1° C; altimeter 29.87 inches of mercury.<br />
At 2253, the recorded weather at the Eagle River Union Airport, near Eagle River, Wisconsin,<br />
was: Wind calm; visibility 10 statute miles; sky condition clear; temperature 0° C; dew point 0°<br />
C; altimeter 29.86 inches of mercury.<br />
According to U.S. Naval Observatory Sun and Moon Data, the end of local civil twilight in the<br />
Rhinelander, Wisconsin, area was 2031 and local moonset was at 0507 on April 27, 2018. The<br />
observatory characterized the phase of the moon as "waxing gibbous with 88% of the Moon's<br />
visible disk illuminated."<br />
<br />
<br />
The helicopter was found in a wooded area about 178° and 8.4 nautical miles from 60WI. First<br />
responders indicated that the sky was clear, the moon was visible, and there was a smell of fuel<br />
at the time the helicopter was located. However, the wreckage did not exhibit any signs of fire.<br />
A tree about 70 ft tall about 66° and 47 feet from the nose of the wreckage had branches broken<br />
in its upper canopy. Trees in between this tree and the wreckage had their trunks and branches<br />
broken and linearly separated. The path of the broken and separated trunks and branches<br />
through the trees was steep. A ground impression about 11 ft by 9 ft and 2 ft deep was found in<br />
front of the helicopter wreckage. The helicopter came to rest on its right side. The heading of<br />
the wreckage from tail to nose was about 095°.<br />
<br />
During the on-scene examination, the smell of<br />
fuel was present at the site and in the ground below the helicopter. All major components of<br />
the helicopter were located at the site. The cockpit and cabin area was destroyed. The fuselage<br />
exhibited rearward crushing deformation. The tailboom was attached to the fuselage. The tail<br />
rotor gear box and tail rotor blades remained on the tail. However, the vertical fin had partially<br />
detached from the end of the tailboom. Both horizontal stabilizers were present on the tail. All<br />
three rotor blades remained attached to the rotor hub, and the rotor hub was attached to the<br />
transmission. The main rotor blades exhibited damage to include spar fractures and leadingedge<br />
abrasions and depressions.<br />
<br />
The main rotor hub rotated when the transmission's input drive shaft was rotated by hand. The fuel tank was fragmented. Yaw, pitch, lateral, and collective controls were traced from the cockpit to their respective servo actuators.<br />
<br />
Engine controls were traced from the cockpit through their respective bellcranks to their engine<br />
components. A magnetic plug in the hydraulic system had some particulate on its magnetic<br />
end. The filter bypass button on the hydraulic control block was popped. The hydraulic pump<br />
was turned by a drill and the pump exhibited a suction and pressure at the pump's inlet and<br />
outlet. Disassembly of the hydraulic pump revealed scoring witness marks on the pump<br />
<br />
Page 3 of 4 CEN18FA149<br />
<br />
housing in its gear's plane of rotation and no debris or obstructions were observed within the<br />
pump ports.<br />
The engine was found on the ground and was separated from the fuselage. The engine's<br />
compressor blades exhibited nick and gouge damage consistent with foreign object ingestion.<br />
The power turbine blades exhibited silver colored deposits on them. The power turbine was<br />
turned by hand and the drive train did not turn. Subsequent examination revealed that the<br />
engine's Module 5 reduction gearbox had migrated out of its installed position, rearward, to the<br />
extent its O-ring groove was visible. The Module 5 gearbox was removed for inspection of the<br />
input pinion torque alignment marks. The marks were found to be misaligned approximately 2<br />
millimeters in the tightening direction which is consistent with engine power being delivered to<br />
the drive train during the main rotor blade impact sequence.<br />
<br />
The Oneida County Coroner was asked to perform an autopsy on the pilot and to take<br />
toxicological samples.<br />
<br />
<br />
<b><i>The helicopter was equipped with an Appareo Vision 1000 recorder unit, which records to both</i></b><br />
<b><i>a removable secure data (SD) card and internal memory. Both the unit and the SD card</i></b><br />
<b><i>sustained impact damage. The unit and its SD card were shipped to the National</i></b><br />
<b><i>Transportation Safety Board Recorder Laboratory to see if they contain data in reference to the</i></b><br />
<b><i>accident flight.</i></b> (emphasis added)<br />
<br />
A hydraulic fluid sample and a fuel sample were retained for testing.<br />
Additionally, the hydraulic magnetic plug, the hydraulic pump, hydraulic filter, four actuators,<br />
and the EGPWS were retained for further examination.<br />
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information<br />
Aircraft Make: EUROCOPTER Registration: N127LN<br />
Model/Series: AS 350 B2 NO SERIES Aircraft Category: Helicopter<br />
Amateur Built: No<br />
Operator: AIR METHODS CORP Operating Certificate(s)<br />
Held:<br />
On-demand Air Taxi (135)<br />
Operator Does Business As: Operator Designator Code: QMLA<br />
Page 4 of 4 CEN18FA149<br />
<br />
<br />
Editor's note: These guys were just.like.us. What happened to them could happen to us. Let us never forget these good souls. Let us keep their families - who will suffer for this until the end of their days - in our hearts. And let us resolve to <i>learn</i> from this tragedy in order to prevent something like this from happening again.<br />
<br />
Otherwise?<br />
<br />
It will.<br />
<br />
<br />
<img alt="Rico Caruso" src="https://www.gannett-cdn.com/-mm-/3b9e52332d6dc9797fd5d1707e48187236da38f7/c=58-0-387-439/local/-/media/2018/04/28/WIGroup/Appleton/636605494412920689-Rico-Caruso.PNG?width=180&height=240&fit=crop" /><img alt="Klint Mitchell" src="https://www.gannett-cdn.com/-mm-/5adfc335ca0788152ddc2866a0038cd66f3c79e0/c=0-0-290-387/local/-/media/2018/04/28/WIGroup/Appleton/636605494410580704-Klint-Mitchell.PNG?width=180&height=240&fit=crop" /><img alt="Greg Rosenthal." src="https://www.gannett-cdn.com/-mm-/6fec49213044aad73e9e088c9b7be1e6d9d4ee8f/c=48-0-285-316/local/-/media/2018/04/28/WIGroup/Appleton/636605494408084720-Greg-Rosenthal.PNG?width=180&height=240&fit=crop" /><br />
<br />Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-67110458951782790552018-09-25T11:33:00.002-07:002018-09-28T05:19:55.594-07:00It’s Time to Check the Checklist! By Josh Henke, Flight Nurse<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhuCKobLzdrgcU0aqEeKhrnR_uKv0CdL0e_cKntQpTS0p13pQY5QYrcPzAsIDN3ckyzEntkniezartNfrbR0bGl-IJgBZeCe8rlMI7UY9XHvnDjtKyGcGLW5aeFW_QuZ1DZCW1dvrImJhM/s1600/checklistcartoon.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="390" data-original-width="395" height="315" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhuCKobLzdrgcU0aqEeKhrnR_uKv0CdL0e_cKntQpTS0p13pQY5QYrcPzAsIDN3ckyzEntkniezartNfrbR0bGl-IJgBZeCe8rlMI7UY9XHvnDjtKyGcGLW5aeFW_QuZ1DZCW1dvrImJhM/s320/checklistcartoon.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Checklists and standardization have saved countless lives. But<br />
"collective mindfulness" requires us to think beyond the list.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
I think we can all agree that the checklist has revolutionized our industry both in commercial aviation, military aviation and HEMS. Gone are the days of going through checks thinking you put all the A tabs into the B slots and taking off by memory. And hopefully gone are the days of realizing at 500 feet of altittude that you forgot to put tab A123 into slot B 420 and returning rapidly to the earth.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
Yes, checklists are good.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
But they can also be bad.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
Yup, I said it. Blasphemy……<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
Yes, checklists can be bad.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
We have likely seen it or been a part of it - I know I have. We all climb in the aircraft and run through the checklist and everything is the same as the day before.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
“Chocks, covers, cords?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
<i>“Stowed”<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
“Engine mode switches?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
<i>“In flight”<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
“Caution and warning lights”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
<i>“All out”<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
“Doors and belts?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
<i>“Secure left, right, etc.”<o:p></o:p></i></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
We say the same things every flight. And we get into a routine. We all do it. You are not immune, I am not immune, Chuck Yeager is not immune.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
Complacency is unavoidable. It is a problem that is NEVER solved, but constantly managed. The key to coping with complacency is learning how to have a functional relationship with it, knowing what it looks like and how to call it out on the carpet when it’s identified.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
The checklist can be a great tool, but we need to check on it every now and then. It would be foolish to put a checklist in place, dust off our hands and say, “OK, the checklist is in place, now just follow it every time and we will be just fine.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
The checklist is a link to our survival and safety, but you can’t just put one in place and ignore it hoping that it is functioning appropriately. You need to monitor it. In short, just like everything else, you have got to check the oil and make sure it's functioning properly.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
In the checklist above, can you see the problem?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
Better yet, can you NOT see the problem?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
In that checklist, we can lay eyes on every part of what we are covering just before lifting, except for the covers and chocks.</div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
The point I’m trying to make is, just because you have a checklist doesn't mean that everything is OK. It needs to be evaluated and re-vamped from time to time. You need to seek out the faults in your checklist and bring them to light.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
In our particular checklist, there is one item that we can’t visually inspect at the time the checklist is being performed. This leaves us prone to error. I have suggested a change of operation for my program to mitigate this.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
I suggest that each of you take a look at your checklists and try to find a hole. Find something that isn’t quite right and fix it.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
Go……go check the oil. Make sure everything is working the way it should be. Be a stickler about perfect function.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<br />
<div class="Body">
GO……..think outside of the box, look at things critically and make tomorrow just a little safer.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="Body">
<br /></div>
<div class="Body">
We save lives for a living. Let's save our own while we are at it.</div>
Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-80628568528374858162018-09-09T07:16:00.003-07:002018-09-09T07:16:53.440-07:00NTSB Final Report : North Memorial Air Care Crash<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPdcsl6cDP1_EJC1v3fevCAzs9_jy0W6gDUATgWXQMea984b5haEH9_7RhocF1223crU-92uMFvycQsM-M2KyDPykfzkp9vY_dOAEfjYrwE2H4V2Tf-ScuYriP-QVX8hwIJDa6X5rKdHo/s1600/north+memorial+crash.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="269" data-original-width="675" height="156" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPdcsl6cDP1_EJC1v3fevCAzs9_jy0W6gDUATgWXQMea984b5haEH9_7RhocF1223crU-92uMFvycQsM-M2KyDPykfzkp9vY_dOAEfjYrwE2H4V2Tf-ScuYriP-QVX8hwIJDa6X5rKdHo/s400/north+memorial+crash.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
The pilot and two medical crewmembers were conducting a night instrument flight rules cross-country flight to pick up a patient. During the instrument approach to the destination airport, the weather conditions deteriorated. The pilot was using the helicopter's autopilot to fly the GPS approach to the airport, and the pilot and the medical crew reported normal helicopter operations. Upon reaching the GPS approach minimum descent altitude, the pilot was unable to see the airport and executed a go-around. The pilot reported that, after initiating the go-around, he attempted to counteract, with right cyclic input, an uncommanded sharp left 45° bank . Recorded flight data revealed that the helicopter climbed and made a progressive right bank that reached 50°. The helicopter descended as the right bank continued, and the airspeed increased until the helicopter impacted treetops. The helicopter then impacted terrain on it's right side and came to rest near a group of trees.<br />
<br />
Postaccident examinations of the helicopter and flight control systems did not reveal any malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The helicopter was equipped with a GPS roll steering modification that featured a switch that allowed the pilot to manually select the heading reference source. In case of a malfunction or an erroneous setting, the helicopter's automatic flight control system had at least two limiters in place to prevent excessive roll commands. Further testing revealed that the GPS roll steering modification could not compromise the flight director and autopilot functionalities to the point of upsetting the helicopter attitudes or moving beyond the systems limiters.<br />
<br />
Recorded helicopter, engine, and flight track data were analyzed and used to conduct flight simulations. The simulations revealed that the helicopter was operated within the prescribed limits; no evidence of an uncommanded 45° left bank was found. The helicopter performed a constant right climbing turn with decreasing airspeed followed by a progressive right bank with the airspeed and descent rate increasing. In order to recover, the simulations required large collective inputs and a steep right bank; such maneuvers are difficult when performed in night conditions with no visual references, although less demanding in day conditions with clear visual references. The data are indicative of a descending accelerated spiral, likely precipitated by the pilot inputting excessive right cyclic control during the missed approach go-around maneuver, which resulted in a loss of control.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Probable Cause and Findings<br />
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:<br />
<br />
<br />
The pilot's excessive cyclic input during a missed approach maneuver in night instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in a loss of control and spiraling descent into terrain.Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-1767988236898853232018-09-09T06:46:00.002-07:002018-09-09T06:46:29.863-07:00Good Souls...<iframe allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/aBEA-2wCTZc" width="560"></iframe>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-79117864062523429642018-06-17T04:14:00.000-07:002018-09-25T11:09:15.008-07:00...The Journey to High ReliabilityWhile attending a recent Promedica Health Safety Conference to present a class on hazardous attitudes, I was able to take in a presentation by Dr. Kate Kellogg (MedStar, Washington DC) on "High-Reliability Organizations."<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhs5nz_SN8k47R_N9MfgNqmSI9R__30uRlhXmMXQUxHIZWclEiNu_W8oAnBSPEndV0iUJpAXFvBuOrzsb3PBbWrvGocDBC6rhRiNWvth0CJDB2eVF-f5Kd4tXyJaYh0xOm63F9gMlYcFlc/s1600/1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="960" data-original-width="720" height="640" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhs5nz_SN8k47R_N9MfgNqmSI9R__30uRlhXmMXQUxHIZWclEiNu_W8oAnBSPEndV0iUJpAXFvBuOrzsb3PBbWrvGocDBC6rhRiNWvth0CJDB2eVF-f5Kd4tXyJaYh0xOm63F9gMlYcFlc/s640/1.jpg" width="480" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Jonathan Godfrey, Randy Mains, and Dan Foulds<br />
presenting AMRM topics and learning about<br />
High-Reliability Organizations from<br />
Dr. Kate Kellogg, MD</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<br />
<br />
At AMTC, I heard Dr. Ira Blumen state that, regarding risk to patients flown in EMS helicopters, "the real risk starts when they are unloaded from the helicopter and wheeled into the hospital." Hospitals have come under scrutiny for causing harm to patients, and some of them have looked for ways to stop doing this.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Many hospitals and health-care systems have made great strides in improving patient care and reducing incidents of harm by adopting the tenets of (Air) Crew Resource Management, and then developing them further. HRO research started with the Nuclear Navy, management of the power-grid (nuclear), and air traffic control. Instead of focusing on industries and companies that went wrong (Three Mile Island) three UCB researchers concentrated on complex industries that did things right - successfully!<br />
<br />
This video is long, and you may not get through it all in one sitting, but I encourage you to get a cold drink, and a note-pad and capture the key ideas and techniques that Dr. Mark covers.<br />
<b><br /></b> <b>If we want to eliminate fatal crashes in HEMS, it's apparent that we are going to have to do something different. What we are doing now doesn't work. We kill patients and crews regularly.</b><br />
<br />
When you think about fatal crashes in HEMS, the <i>only</i> acceptable number is ZERO.<br />
<br />
PS. Feel free to share this with your company's C.E.O; because that's where your company's journey to High Reliability will have to start...<br />
<br />
<iframe allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/kM1UPCBzErY" width="560"></iframe>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-25269210721185743812018-05-29T12:42:00.003-07:002018-05-29T12:42:47.291-07:00My Engine Just Quit! NOW WHAT? Pilot Professional Development Courtesy of the AOPA Air Safety Institute<span style="background-color: white; color: #111111; font-family: Roboto, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap;">British warbird pilot, Mark Levy, was part of a 21-airplane formation in the annual airshow at Duxford, England when the P-51 he was flying had a partial engine out. Levy recorded the entire event on a pair of point-of-view video cameras, and he shared the images, as well as his lessons learned, in a candid discussion with Richard McSpadden, Executive Director of the AOPA Air Safety Institute.</span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #111111; font-family: Roboto, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #111111; font-family: Roboto, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap;">We recommend you gather a notepad and pen and catch the key words and phrases that Mark mentions as he discusses his mishap. This is an excellent foray into pilot-psychology, how emergencies affect our physiology, when to act instinctively and when to take a deep breath and think things through. Mark repeatedly mentions "startle effect" which is a hot topic with the FAA right now. </span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #111111; font-family: Roboto, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span>
<span style="color: #111111; font-family: Roboto, Arial, sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap;">One of the greatest pilot-learning resources is "hangar flying" with other pilots, but a HEMS pilot has little opportunity to do this. This video is a great hangar-flying experience, and might just save your life someday. Kudos and thanks to AOPA and the Air Safety Institute...</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #111111; font-family: Roboto, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white; font-size: 14px; white-space: pre-wrap;"><span style="color: #111111; font-family: Roboto, Arial, sans-serif;"><iframe allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/BBpqvPujZgM" width="560"></iframe></span></span>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-51508450637515498242018-05-09T09:15:00.000-07:002018-05-10T14:40:56.831-07:00Use of Automated Flight Control for the Single Pilot Helicopter Program - by John Bevilacqua - EC145 HAA Pilot and NEMSPA Board Member<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><br /></i></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhp79r_mi6kSXguRzA0ycKk27-XnlRWh2y9lrDYRizeTyqGMKzefPrllXQ2DP0wtKR3DLDUdKvcMTqpw_BnhrLiZh9yi4XAU6astuTyR-dHXZv2KgEjpJeOvbLDyO1msh4b395qV8ARpsE/s1600/HELISAS.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="500" data-original-width="500" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhp79r_mi6kSXguRzA0ycKk27-XnlRWh2y9lrDYRizeTyqGMKzefPrllXQ2DP0wtKR3DLDUdKvcMTqpw_BnhrLiZh9yi4XAU6astuTyR-dHXZv2KgEjpJeOvbLDyO1msh4b395qV8ARpsE/s320/HELISAS.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><i>I<b>s your program flying IFR, or is it VFR only? Single-pilot or dual-pilot? The advent of inexpensive and lightweight automation has enabled another concept, but the author doesn't think we realizing the full value of our investment</b></i><br />
<b style="text-align: center;"><br /></b>
<b style="text-align: center;"> SINGLE-PILOT/AUTOPILOT.</b></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br /><br />
A prerequisite in the authorization of single-pilot programs to operate IFR, under actual IMC, is that the aircraft be equipped with a functioning Autopilot. During instrument flight, if the Autopilot is utilized, the pilot then becomes the “pilot monitoring” or PM, while the Pilot flying (PF), is actually the Autopilot!<br />
<br />
The human pilot’s role is to correctly program the autopilot, monitor to make sure it is functioning correctly in its navigation and “coupling” functions, and be ready to take over if the Autopilot<br />
malfunctions in a significant way. At a certain point of flight the pilot must take over, but for the majority, it is the autopilot that is in control of staying on course and on altitude.<br />
<br />
There have been a chronic and disturbing number of HAA and other civil helicopter accidents which<br />
could have most likely been prevented by smart use of the installed Autopilot equipment. An analysis of the probable causes of many of these accidents and close calls in the civil helicopter world show that the “mishap aircraft” were equipped with perfectly functioning and available Autopilots. (Referred subsequently in this article as APs). A simple push of two buttons, depending on the type of AP, could have stabilized the aircraft, established a safe climb and heading away from the hazards on the ground, and smoothly transitioned the flight to a safe cruise altitude and setup for an instrument approach (or flight to better weather and VFR recovery). BUT THE AUTOPILOT WAS NOT USED.<br />
The aircraft was hand flown, unnecessarily and with adverse consequences. For various reasons due to aircraft certification, pilot training, and an aviation culture that emphasizes manual flying, the AP is not being utilized to the extent it should be.<br />
<br />
The reason the AP modes are not being used when they should are numerous and varied, but can be<br />
summarized by a lack of clear guidance on when and how to use an AP for pilots who are not IFR current or qualified, or ar in aircraft that are equipped with an AP, but for various regulatory reasons, are not<br />
certified for IFR flight. There are also single pilot IFR programs in which both the pilot and aircraft are qualified and certified, but due to an “old-school” mindset, the AP is used only during actual IMC, and only sporadically during other phases of flight.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
USE OF AP IN ROUTINE VFR FLIGHT AND DURING IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES</div>
<br />
For routine VFR flight, the benefits of using the AP for many phases of flight are that it reduces pilot<br />
workload, especially single pilot, and allows the pilot additional task management resources tomanage the overall flight. This includes scanning outside to enhance situational awareness regarding<br />
weather, air traffic, birds or other hazards to flight. Ironically to some, the momentary ”heads down”<br />
that might be necessary to engage the AP results in a much greater level of “heads up” for the rest of<br />
the flight.<br />
<br />
In the dynamic and changing flight environment in which helicopters operate, there are numerous<br />
situations or hazards in which routine use of AP could be of immense benefit. A pilot incapacitation<br />
event, especially with a lone pilot at the controls, could be fatal due to the subsequent loss of control.<br />
Pilot incapacitation can result from a medical event, or from a bird or other object coming through the windscreen and striking the pilot. More recent flight hazards include laser strikes and an increase in the number of drones in the vicinity of helicopter operations. While strategies to mitigate these risks depend on the specific hazard, protective equipment, type of aircraft, and pilot training, one universal truth is that the AP is basically invulnerable to many of the human frailties that can take a pilot out of commission in his or her ability to operate the helicopter. It cannot be temporarily blinded, suffer from nausea, tunnel vision or vertigo, or panic when an extreme event occurs. Allowing the AP to operate the aircraft in routine flight, or activating it if possible ASAP after certain emergencies, could be just what is needed to stabilize the emergency situation and allow the pilot to recover or resume control with the assistance of the AP.<br />
<br />
For flights in marginal VFR conditions, use of the Autopilot is even more important. Autopilots can help pilots fly safely when they lose visibility during inadvertent entry in instrument meteorological<br />
conditions (IIMC) when their helicopter flies into clouds and/or fog. With the loss of visual flight<br />
references, VFR pilots can lose an accurate sense of their location, altitude, and angle with respect to<br />
the ground and horizon, thus they are flying “blind.”<br />
<br />
Flights into IIMC are completely non-dramatic if the pilot understands the basics of the AP system and use, programs it properly, and get it activated as soon as possible after takeoff. Many recent HAA<br />
accidents have been a result of pilots, usually on deck at a landing zone, taking off and encountering<br />
unexpected low ceilings and then attempting to manually fly the aircraft in IMC. This is a recipe for<br />
spatial disorientation and subsequent loss of control. For AP equipped aircraft, the formula for survival under similar circumstances is to have a plan in which the takeoff brief includes pre-selecting your altitude in the AP, and a heading which clears you of obstacles ASAP and is preferably into the wind. (This allows the pitot-static instruments to come up to speed expeditiously and allow instrument flight and AP use).<br />
<br />
As soon as possible after the aircraft reaches Vmini, (minimum AP activation airspeed) activate the heading select and a vertical climb mode. Climb using max continuous power and accelerate to best climb airspeed. Your strategy will have the AP flying the aircraft, and if you experience spatial<br />
disorientation it will be relatively benign because you are not flying the aircraft; the autopilot is.<br />
<br />
Yes, you need to be vigilantly monitoring the AP’s performance, and ready to take over manually if necessary, but the primary focus is planning, programming, monitoring, and letting the automation complete the task of getting you up to a safe altitude and on a safe heading. Keep it on the AP for the rest of the flight as you tune radios, contact ATC, choose and program the approach to the most appropriate recovery airport.<br />
<br />
Pilot Incapacitation<br />
<br />
Medical events have the potential to incapacitate a pilot temporarily, at the very least. A medical<br />
event due to a concussion or blinding because of an object striking the pilot. More recent flight hazards include laser strikes and an increase in the number of drones in the vicinity of helicopter operations. While strategies to mitigate these risks depend on the specific hazard, protective equipment, type of aircraft, and pilot training - one universal truth is that the AP is basically invulnerable to many of the human frailties that can take a pilot out of commission in<br />
his or her ability to operate the helicopter. It cannot be temporarily blinded, will not suffer from nausea, tunnel vision or vertigo, or never panics when an extreme event occurs. Allowing the AP to operate the aircraft in routine flight, or activating it if possible ASAP after certain emergencies, could be just what is needed to stabilize the emergency situation and allow the pilot to recover or resume control with the assistance of the AP.<br />
<br />
For AP equipped aircraft, the formula for survival under similar circumstances is to have a plan in which the takeoff brief includes pre-selecting your altitude in the AP, and a heading which clears you of obstacles ASAP, and is preferably into the wind. (This allows the pitot -static instruments to come up to speed expeditiously and allow instrument flight and AP use). As soon as possible after the aircraft reaches Vmini, (minimum AP activation airspeed) activate the heading select and a vertical climb mode.<br />
<br />
Climb using max continuous power and accelerate to best climb airspeed. Your strategy will have the AP flying the aircraft, and if you experience spatial disorientation it will be relatively benign because you are not flying the aircraft, the AP is. You need to be vigilantly monitoring the AP’s performance, and ready to take over manually if necessary, but the primary focus is planning, programming, monitoring, and let the automation complete the task of getting you up to a safe altitude and on a safe heading. Keep it on the AP for the rest of the flight as you tune radios, contact ATC, choose and program and approach to the most appropriate recovery airport.<br />
<br />
TRAINING FOR INCREASED ROUTINE USE OF THE AUTOPILOT<br />
<br />
In the airline industry, there has been an increased emphasis on scenario-based training, also known asnLOFT (Line Oriented Flight Training). The philosophy of this training, which is usually flight simulator based, can be summarized below<br />
<br />
(Source - ICAO Circular 217 AN/132 'Human Factors Digest No 2): “LOFT scenarios may be developed from many sources, but accident reports provide a realistic and appropriate starting point. A properly conducted LOFT program can provide great insight into the internal workings of an airline's operations and training program for the following reasons:<br />
<br />
1. If similar mistakes seem to be recurring among pilots, it may indicate a potentially serious problem as a result of incorrect procedures, conflicting or incorrect manuals, or other operational aspects.<br />
2. It may reveal areas in aircrew training programmes which are weak or which need emphasis.<br />
3. It may reveal problems with instrument locations, the information being presented to pilots or other difficulties with the physical layout of a particular flight deck.<br />
4. Air carriers can use it to test and verify flight deck operational procedures.<br />
<br />
LOFT should not be used as a method of checking the performance of individuals. Instead, it is<br />
a validation of training programs and operational procedures. An individual or crew needing<br />
additional training after a LOFT session should be afforded that opportunity immediately with<br />
no stigma or recrimination.”<br />
<br />
With this training philosophy in mind, this is how HAA and other single pilot helicopter operators<br />
industry could change normal training and checkrides with respect to AP use:<br />
<br />
Flight Training plan – Inadvertent IMC . -Most Inadvertent IMC training is done on a checkride, at altitude, in cruise flight VFR. Focus the training scenario instead as a simulated inadvertent IMC at a low altitude while taking off from your home airport.<br />
<br />
Announce “inadvertent IMC” at about 100’ AGL. The drill should promote a before takeoff checklist which addresses the use of Autopilot modes and cockpit setup, the importance of an “airspeed over altitude” which gets you to Vmini quickly, and selecting the appropriate climb modes and power setting (for a two or three-axis autopilot).<br />
<br />
Even if not set up and briefed for IFR flight, train how to quickly and efficiently identify and activate the right AP modes for the situation. Hand flying should be discouraged if the AP is available. For simulator training, the same applies. All takeoffs, even under simulated VMC, should be flown either with the AP engaged as soon as possible, or set up for immediate activation.<br />
<br />
If the inadvertent IMC conditions are given at altitude while the pilot is flying manually, emphasize the need to activate the Autopilot. Hand-flying the aircraft under IMC, while single pilot, should be trained realistically, emphasizing that the pilot should not be conducting this type of flying<br />
under real-world conditions and that the manually flying Single Pilot while IMC is an “emergency<br />
procedure”. It is fine to practice in the simulator, but not in the aircraft unless there is another qualified Safety Pilot on board.<br />
<br />
Unusual Attitude Recovery<br />
<br />
Discuss the various visual illusions which can lead to spatial disorientation and the need for a good scan and transition to a pure instrument scan during night, IMC, marginal VFR and flat light conditions, and the need for an adequate visible horizon to continue a VMC flying<br />
<br />
A common flight simulator and checkride item is “unusual attitude recovery” most often flown manually by manipulating the flight controls. For AP equipped aircraft the emphasis should shift to:<br />
<br />
1. AVOIDANCE – Unusual Attitudes are usually a result of pilot distraction, poor instrument scan<br />
technique, leading to severe, incapacitating spatial disorientation. The AP is not susceptible to these<br />
illusions and incapacitation. ACTIVATE THE AP. Disciplined use of appropriate AP modes during<br />
night, IMC, or low light/flat light conditions, will virtually eliminate the pilot’s disorienting analysis of the aircraft’s multi-dimensional flight attitude and subsequent attempt at manual recovery.<br />
<br />
2. RECOVERY – If the preventative measure did not work, and an unusual attitude is noticed on the<br />
pilot’s attitude gyro and other flight instruments, quick and simple activation of AP modes should be<br />
considered as a primary method of recovery. In cruise flight, the current collective power should be<br />
more than adequate to simply hit Altitude Hold and Heading Select. The aircraft will then level itself<br />
and fly straight on the selected heading and any climb or descent should cease at the current<br />
altitude. Once the aircraft is stabilized, check power setting and select an appropriate flight mode<br />
for climbing if necessary, but STAY ON THE AP.<br />
<br />
The “best practices” in this article are intentionally generic will need to be modified depending on individual aircraft and Autopilot types, company OPSPECS and types of operations. But the message is clear - if you are fortunate enough to have an Autopilot aboard your helicopter - use it!<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-71671827547400562972018-05-06T06:33:00.001-07:002018-05-06T06:50:47.914-07:00"We do these things, That Others May Live"This is an excellent ADM training resource provided by Airbus. If you have never seen it, it's worth the time. If you have seen it, it's good to watch again <i>with your flight team</i> and discuss the events that occurred.<br />
<br />
What strikes me is that the crew allowed the pilot to proceed so far into a bad situation without "stopping the train." I wonder how many funerals we could have avoided if a team member, typically a nurse or paramedic or RT, had said, "hey, this is a bad idea, we are going by ground" or "we aren't going." This flight team in this video was very very close to being dead. As Omniflight's director of operations said, "we dodged a bullet last night."<br />
<br />
We can get so involved in a scenario that we accommodate to risk as a group. We can also fall prey to the social normalization of deviance. I have been in a risky situation myself - flying into a hospital sitting underneath a thunderstorm with a critical patient on board - and when I asked my crew what they wanted to do they said: "take the chance."<br />
<br />
In retrospect, I was dumb for taking the chance and dumb for asking them to validate my bad decision. A pilot <i>should</i> let a team member make a <i>more</i> conservative decision, but a pilot should <i>never</i> let a team influence a more risky decision. If a pilot has to ask if something is dumb, it probably is and should be avoided...<br />
<br />
You who crew are an integral part of the ADM (aeronautical decision making) process. You have a say in how high we fly and what we fly over, what turbulence level we should tolerate, how low our fuel state can be and most importantly - when we should STOP. If it appears that I the pilot am struggling to make things work, you can and should speak up about doing something different.<br />
<br />
You are not a passenger. Don't act like one. Please. It's a better world with you in it.<br />
<br />
<iframe allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/EMxuO77mdQo?rel=0" width="560"></iframe>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-54631446984140998752018-04-21T13:12:00.001-07:002018-04-21T13:12:07.456-07:00Snakes In The Grass<i>Contributing writer Josh Henke is an avid outdoorsman. He surfs and hikes the backcountry. Josh is a former firefighter and serves as a flight nurse today. You can contact Josh at bosstyn@gmail.com</i><br />
<i><br /></i>
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<i><br /></i> My friend Dave-bob is an avid hiker. Even in southern California, he finds time to hike nearly every day. Dave is old and tired and weathered, but he still hikes almost every day. We often give<br />
him grief about his stick; low terrain, high terrain, it doesn't matter, Dave-bob always has his<br />
stick. After a few years of knowing Dave, I asked him about his stick and why he always carries it.<br />
<br />
"Snakes."<br />
<br />
“Yes, of course,” I thought. That seems plainly obvious now that he says it. Southern California<br />
is known for its rattlesnakes. Big black things that hide in the brush. They are a terrifying thing<br />
when you see one.<br />
<br />
I then asked him, “why such a big stick then”. His stick is damn near a Gandolf-sized staff.<br />
His thoughtful reply was this; “small sticks are good for small snakes, but not big ones. A big<br />
stick is good for small snakes as well as big ones. I use this stick to roust snakes up along the<br />
trail before they have a chance to strike”<br />
<br />
I thought about this in an oft way for weeks as a continued on with life. A few weeks after that<br />
conversation, I saw Dave and he told me a story about hiking. (he loves to tell hiking stories)<br />
Dave told me about how he went hiking at a place called four bush; which actually only has<br />
three bushes, but never mind.<br />
<br />
He was driving up to the trailhead listening to a deeply riveting Paul Harvey episode when he<br />
parked. As many of us do with Paul Harvey, he sat and listened for a while longer. One of those<br />
driveway moments….<br />
He told me how he began his hike and realized he forgot his stick about 3 miles into the trip.<br />
“I figured oh well,” he said and continued on. At mile four he saw a “really interesting bird. Kind<br />
of a grasshopper/bird/old cat kinda thing”. (Dave loves to describe things he sees, however,<br />
he’s not very good at describing more than making up combinations of animals to describe<br />
other animals)<br />
“when I go to the top I stopped and turned around to head back down, and sure as hell, there<br />
was a big black rattlesnake sitting in the path about 5 yards in front of me. He wasn't moving,<br />
just laying in the sun”.<br />
<br />
We both took a silent second to think about that snake, A big slate colored rattlesnake is no<br />
joke, and 6 miles into a hike; a bite from a snake like that is often a death sentence. (or a<br />
helicopter ride at least)<br />
“I sat there and looked at that snake and all I could think about was my damn stick. He looked<br />
at me and I looked at him, and as we both sat there, he began to move. Not fast; he moved in<br />
a very slow, purposeful way directly towards me. As I back up he stopped. When I stopped, he<br />
began moving again. Not in a “hunter” way, but in a “you’re damn lucky Dave” kinda way; as if<br />
he was telling me “I’m not going to bite you, but this is your only warning.”<br />
<br />
I commiserated with him over the snake knowing that you can't just step over it, and<br />
often times on these trails, you are surrounded by grass. The only option for Dave was to leave<br />
the trail and clear around the snake through the grass. The hard part is, there's often snakes in the<br />
grass, and with no stick, it's a big gamble.<br />
<br />
Dave did leave the trail, walking through the grass. He was more than a little worried about it, I could<br />
hear it in his voice as he related his “trail of fears."<br />
The story made me think about sticks and snakes. It also made me think about complacency<br />
and the dangers we face, how the snakes are always in the grass and about how having a<br />
good stick is often salvation.<br />
<br />
I recalled when I was a new flight nurse. Most times when we got a call we would pile into the<br />
aircraft, even before the pilot. We would buckle in even before the pilot had turned up. Once<br />
we got comms, we would ask where we were going and he would point and say something like<br />
“that way about 19 miles”<br />
<br />
We didn’t check the weather with him. We didn’t scout the LZ prior to leaving. Hell, we didn’t even<br />
ask him where we were going. We just hopped up, strapped in and blasted off. We weren't crew, we were pax.<br />
<br />
I'm not afraid to admit it, we had very small sticks.<br />
They did not provide us with a good defense against the snakes in the grass.<br />
Sure, if the helicopter was leaking oil or started smoking on startup, we could see that and cancel the<br />
flight, but our small stick was no good at picking out the less obvious snakes such as weather in<br />
a small valley, knowledge of a known tight LZ, etc.<br />
<br />
Over time I found that my stick got bigger.<br />
And the bigger my stick got, the better prepared I was to meet a snake on the trail or go<br />
wandering off through the grass unplanned.<br />
I grew my stick by asking questions of my pilots. I questioned things that looked wrong. I took a deeply vested interest in my safety by speaking up and looking for “snakes” in our day to day operations.<br />
<br />
I read the archives and thoughtfully explored how a crew got themselves into a situation and<br />
how I could avoid such mistakes in the future.<br />
I wrote about ideas and thoughts I had on safety and how to make others think about safety<br />
All of these things, both big and small, helped me grow my stick to a point where I felt I could<br />
go hiking safely and face down the dangers in the grass, no matter how big.<br />
We as flight crews need big sticks. Complacency is a snake in the grass and small sticks just<br />
won't do. As Dave mentioned, “small sticks only work for small snakes, but a big stick works for<br />
all snakes.”<br />
As we hit the “trail” day in and day out, think about the snakes in the grass you may encounter.<br />
Don’t get distracted before you begin your hike through HEMS. Take the time to remember your stick, because if you forget it, that snake may bite you.<br />
<br />
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<i>If you have a HEMS related story to tell - something that might help another crew - drop us a line.</i>Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-31681616176570030312018-03-24T08:48:00.000-07:002018-06-21T12:16:28.928-07:00The Airlines are Hiring Helicopter Pilots!Is it time for a change of pace? There are programs sponsored by the airlines in which a commercial helicopter pilot can receive transition training and land an airline job. It's happening all over HEMS, right now!<br />
<br />
We tend to favor competitive environments, you either get better or you get lost. The developing competition for a relatively scarce resource - a commercial pilot - has been brought on by the conditions created by aviation employers. When Sully said (the airlines) should respect the profession, no one listened. "The life" of an airline pilot - especially one flying for a regional carrier - became less and less desirable. This was all made starkly apparent during the investigation into the Colgan Air crash near Buffalo New York. Low wages and crash-pad life drove prospective candidates, especially rotor-pilots coming out of the military, into off-shore or HEMS jobs.<br />
<br />
Perhaps the airline industry has passed the nadir; perhaps becoming an airline pilot will once again be a good-paying, respectable employment option. .As the airlines cherry-pick the best rotor-pilots - many of whom have and will continue to come from the ranks of HEMS - a predictable set of events will occur.<br />
<br />
First, companies will try and force overtime on current pilots. Lean is cheap, and there are more vacancies in HEMS than ever before. Eventually, there will be too many holes to fill. As well, HEMS companies will look to hire the very young and the very old. They will dip deeper and deeper into the labor pool.<br />
<br />
We can imagine a conversation like this between two new-hire HEMS pilots.<br />
<br />
"Hey, young fellow! When I started flying, you were in diapers."<br />
<br />
"Oh yeah, Gramps? Well, when I finish flying, it'll be you in the diapers. As a matter of fact, you look pretty 'dependable' today!"<br />
<br />
Barring restraint, and with bases out of service, some companies will hire pilots previously let go; pilots who are too new to get any other job or who have hit the 65 year age limit for part 121 flying. Companies will also seek to lower the hiring-requirements for HEMS pilot. If the rules get in the way of making money, the first thing you do is change the rules.<br />
<br />
We expect that these developments will show up in the accident and error rate, and they will result in clinicians departing HEMS after becoming dismayed at the lack of proficiency of the persons flying. (At least those clinicians who know what a lack of proficiency looks like.) Flying a single-pilot VFR helicopter to an accident scene at 3am is different than flying an airliner as a member of a flight crew. It's not necessarily harder, but it is different. It requires an entirely different set of interpersonal and aviation skills.<br />
<br />
The transitioning rotor pilot will serve in the airlines as a co-pilot until his or her performance has been verified. A retiring airline pilot entering HEMS will be given 8 to 10 hours and a check ride before being cast loose upon the skies. And the med crews. When we flew BKs, A new pilot coud gain initial operating experience with a training captain. Not so in most singles.<br />
<br />
At some point, insurance rates and astronomical lawsuits will drive the fix most strenuously avoided by the HEMS industry.<br />
<br />
Wages will increase to the level of the economic value the pilot brings to the endeavor.<br />
<br />
After all, the airlines are hiring.Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-89480388911068249502018-02-26T09:09:00.000-08:002018-11-11T05:52:28.884-08:00What is Your Tolerance for Turbulence?<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: right; margin-left: 1em; text-align: right;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><img alt="A witness said survivors of the crash ran out of the helicopter screaming" height="222" src="https://cdn.cnn.com/cnnnext/dam/assets/180211100043-01-helicopter-fire-grand-canyon-exlarge-169.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" width="400" /></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Image courtesy Teddy Fujimoto and AZCentral.com</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<b><i>The question of the day...</i></b><br />
<br />
What is Your Tolerance for Turbulence?<br />
<br />
Is it a light tossing? Significant slams? Occasional loss of control? Are you more concerned with turbulence at altitude or near the surface? How much wind will you tolerate near mountainous terrain or large buildings?<br />
<br />
Let's consider an event from 2002...<br />
<br />
"The medevac helicopter lifted off the hospital's rooftop helipad at night. The pilot made a right pedal turn to the northwest, facing a building that extended above the height of the helipad by approximately 10-feet. The paramedic said that when the helicopter was about 20-feet above the helipad, and while he was programming the GPS receiver, a "sudden gust" of wind push the helicopter from directly behind. He was not alerted to anything unusual until he looked up and noticed the helicopter's close proximity to a 16-floor brick building, located at the northern corner of the heliport, which extended above the height of the helipad by 4 floors. The paramedic yelled, "building, building, building!" to alert the pilot. The pilot then made a rapid right cyclic input to avoid hitting the building, but the helicopter struck the building and fell about 13 floors to ground level. The paramedic did not see or hear any warning lights, horns or unusual noises, and was not aware of any mechanical problems with the helicopter. A police officer who flew two missions in the local area prior to the accident said the wind speed at 500 feet agl was at least 25 knots and gusting from the south/southwest. He stood on the primary helipad after the accident and said mechanical turbulence from the building was evident. An FAA inspector who also stood on the rooftop helipad after the accident said the wind gusts were about 20-30 knots from the southwest and they swirled around the heliport. Review of the helicopter flight manual revealed, "Directional controllability during take-off and landing is assured for flight condition with crosswind components up to 17 [knots]." (added - do you know the conditions under which that number was derived?)<br />
<br />
<br />
<iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="274" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/VFcBVAwYXes" width="392"></iframe><br />
<br />
Here's another bit from a later event,<br />
<br />
On March 6, 2015, at 2310 central standard time, an Airbus Helicopters (Eurocopter) EC-130-B4 ... struck the edge of a hospital building and impacted its parking lot during a visual approach to the St Louis University Hospital elevated rooftop helipad (MO55), St Louis, Missouri. During the approach, the helicopter experienced a loss of directional control and entered an uncontrolled descent. The helicopter was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The helicopter was operated under Title 14 CFR Part 91 as an air medical positioning flight that was operating on a company flight plan. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight was returning to MO55 after it had been refueled at the operator’s base in St. Louis, Missouri.<br />
<br />
The flight’s first approach and landing at MO55 was to drop off a medic, nurse, and a patient. During the approach, the pilot reported to the flight nurse and medic that winds were gusting to 25 knots. The flight nurse stated that helicopter was yawing quite a bit and there was a noticeable roll side to side during landing. The helicopter landed without incident during the first approach and landing. The flight then departed to obtain fuel at the operator’s base and then departed to return to MO55, to pick up the medic and flight nurse.The accident occurred during the return’s approach for landing at MO55.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGcIx3GH3zGzhpug8peIQgYS3wceDlm7E2yfypcIFj0jfNBkE6wwPgldXu3h57xpTPYLOG17OdJgtOtUgdBoBabF7Pbkx8i37xsj_dXiBsCQxdqvKIBELdVvnMLK-oEDq5SI5q5pSgm4M/s1600/st+louis+crash.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="820" data-original-width="1200" height="272" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGcIx3GH3zGzhpug8peIQgYS3wceDlm7E2yfypcIFj0jfNBkE6wwPgldXu3h57xpTPYLOG17OdJgtOtUgdBoBabF7Pbkx8i37xsj_dXiBsCQxdqvKIBELdVvnMLK-oEDq5SI5q5pSgm4M/s400/st+louis+crash.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Does your General Operations Manual provide your pilots clear and unambiguous<br />
guidance to be followed upon encountering turbulence? Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?<br />
If not, what are you waiting for?</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
And here is yet another comment in the media regarding a crash for which the investigation is ongoing.<br />
<br />
"More than 20 first responders had to hike to the downed helicopter from an area only accessible with certain vehicles. Emergency crews then had to wait for strong winds to quiet before they could lift passengers out of the canyon."<br />
In this event, a bystander reported gusts to 50 miles per hour on the upper rim of the canyon.<br />
<br />
Here is a bit of text from "Skybrary" on turbulence.<br />
<br />
"Air moving over or around high ground may create turbulence in the lee of the terrain feature. This may produce violent and, for smaller aircraft, potentially uncontrollable effects resulting in pitch and/or roll to extreme positions"<br />
<br />
Of course, we don't ever want to fly our helicopters into "uncontrollable" conditions. Do we? The question is; how close to uncontrollable should we get? The answer is not in the rotorcraft flight manual. The manufacturer wants to sell you an aircraft, not talk you out of it. The answer is also most-likely not coming from your company. They leave a decision like this up to you the pilot - and to a lesser extent the medical team. "Tribal knowledge" has been offered as guidance. Or perhaps we should ask ourselves "what would the other guys do?"<br />
<br />
Here's the problem with that idea... <b><i>What if the other guys are out flying because we are? </i></b>What if we are all waiting for the first crew to say "stop!"<br />
<br />
I humbly offer a bit of advice. If at any time you feel that turbulence is putting you at risk for loss of control and unplanned contact with an obstacle,...<br />
<br />
Knock it off!<br />
<br />
<i>"The pilot reported that he performed his approach into the wind. On short final he could feel periodic gusts of wind. The pilot executed the standard approach to the helipad and the helicopter encountered another gust that picked the helicopter's nose up as it was moving over the pad. He maneuvered the helicopter to center it over the pad when he heard a sound like "metal on metal as if the tail rotor had hit something a couple times." The pilot felt no initial feedback in the controls, he felt the helicopter yaw to the left, and the helicopter continued to yaw to the left with his full application of right pedal. He lowered the collective and rolled off the throttle to enter a hovering autorotation and attempted to land it as level as possible. The helicopter landed hard. The operator reported substantial ground damage occurred to the tail rotor gearbox and tail rotor blades and a review of images revealed damage to the tail boom. A nearby fence and light were reported to be damaged. The operator's accident report indicated that there were no mechanical malfunctions with the helicopter.</i><br />
<i><br /></i> <i>Probable Cause and Findings</i><br />
<i>The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:</i><br />
<br />
<i>The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from the ground obstacle during the landing with gusting winds present."</i><br />
<br />
Are you performing operations near an obstructed confined area or a perilous pinnacle? Are you getting your butt handed to you?<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgEj51YW6gz_IgKx_JSdhmE4Magw1FFnkELOWZ-JXcyFbE9Kd3Y3WnLUhd2cMdT4esxxtNic2rSooRkaa8muKQBD1gYUrhPcmu1vnjDkWUbJMGaDv3xrgUTpGDJLrxFoJ4n8Twdc-6C0mw/s1600/windtunnelhelipadpic.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="319" data-original-width="480" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgEj51YW6gz_IgKx_JSdhmE4Magw1FFnkELOWZ-JXcyFbE9Kd3Y3WnLUhd2cMdT4esxxtNic2rSooRkaa8muKQBD1gYUrhPcmu1vnjDkWUbJMGaDv3xrgUTpGDJLrxFoJ4n8Twdc-6C0mw/s320/windtunnelhelipadpic.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Go to a big flat airport with few obstacles and greater chances for stable flowing winds. That's where manufacturers test for controllability. Give yourself the same benefits that the test pilots get.Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-10497912036175082652018-01-02T06:46:00.000-08:002018-03-06T06:50:25.556-08:00Thank you for stopping by...<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9BqwmP3zGdP_PFJNa1tW9fbV-rLzM4foAElItunLF2itRZFPwel2jSE9gtz8BhXqfig533JhCOFCMvOUHyIBRf_dQX7fT6n7EzLjStgNGmkEbR90vs8sHVDl7Md1EiTFhjZrZNaBxr_I/s1600/danandkids.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="483" data-original-width="483" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj9BqwmP3zGdP_PFJNa1tW9fbV-rLzM4foAElItunLF2itRZFPwel2jSE9gtz8BhXqfig533JhCOFCMvOUHyIBRf_dQX7fT6n7EzLjStgNGmkEbR90vs8sHVDl7Md1EiTFhjZrZNaBxr_I/s400/danandkids.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Each of us has an obligation to pass on what we have learned, as others<br />
passed knowledge and experience on to us.</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
Greetings friends and Happy New Year!<br />
<br />
In the spirit of new beginnings, I am henceforth going to focus on writing for Vertical 911 with the help of my friend and editor Elan Head. The frequency of posts here will likely decrease since getting paid for writing is more fun. I never received a penny for any of this, yet it has been the most rewarding experience imaginable. I recommend blogging to anyone - and anyone has stories to tell. And it's free! On occasion, I spoke truth to power - and that was refreshing. I have had strangers walk up to me at conferences, look me in the eye, and thank me for this blog.<br />
<br />
Free and Priceless!<br />
<br />
I want to thank each of you who have stopped by to visit HelicopterEMS.com, and especially those of you who took the time to comment - and in some cases - to contribute to the blog. When I began this project it was a natural progression from visiting Lyn Burks' bulletin board at "JustHelicopters.com" and discussing helicopter topics there. I was an active HEMS pilot, had time on my hands, and things to say. Blogger offered a platform for that discussion. I remember exclaiming to my flight-nurse wife Jeanne that two hundred people had visited the blog! That number now approaches a quarter of a million. It has been a ton of fun!<br />
<br />
I hope that you who have visited, and you who visit anew have or will derive some enjoyment from the thoughts of a common helicopter pilot. When I started, Air Methods was a middling-sized outfit, Omniflight was in ascension, OCC's were a new development, and crashes were all too common. Somewhere along the way, I began to think that maybe one person with a keyboard could affect the number of fatal crashes we experience in HEMS.<br />
<br />
Crazy right?<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihsylrTq8YY-aukrYiuG44iUUffWbJrVPxL2aLIbRiptLFSQ8YWmf87vbYe8m7JEP6UKHnpiFTpOGvitwss3_RFlu3xZVc3_MxXFNuygyklxoGshAY8OPPYvCYeLGWmL8L5h9iWamMYVY/s1600/greenmachinebeaufort.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="960" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEihsylrTq8YY-aukrYiuG44iUUffWbJrVPxL2aLIbRiptLFSQ8YWmf87vbYe8m7JEP6UKHnpiFTpOGvitwss3_RFlu3xZVc3_MxXFNuygyklxoGshAY8OPPYvCYeLGWmL8L5h9iWamMYVY/s400/greenmachinebeaufort.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">HEMS doesn't pay much, but there is a great view from the office. At Beaufort Memorial<br />
with the Green Machine - she's been there and done that and got a new tail.I was<br />
thinking of her when I wrote "Out of Sight but Never Out of Mind-Tail Rotor Tales"</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
On the last USHST conference call, a speaker talked about the personal side of safety education and outreach. What I took away from his comments is that we have to make an emotional connection - as well as a cognitive one - with the people who climb in helicopters and decide how to operate them. I think that is the key, and rather than differentiating the people who have crashed and killed themselves and others, I think it's best to relate to them as personally as possible: To understand their humanity, their strengths and weaknesses, and what might have led them to disaster. Once we relate to crash victims, to "see their side of the story," then perhaps we are in a better position to understand when we might be on the path to a fatal-end ourselves. Rather than beating people over the head with a litany of criticisms and mandates, we should "nudge" flight teams in the right direction; toward safety and success and long life.<br />
<br />
Life is Good, right?<br />
<br />
From my time spent on this blog I got to be involved with NEMSPA. I got to meet Josh Henke and Krista Haugen and Jonathan Godfrey, and Kurt and Miles and Bill. And maybe I got to meet you. I got to present at several AMTCs, and perhaps I was able to make HEMS just a <i>little bit </i>better.<br />
<br />
My most fervent desire was for us to experience a complete year without anyone being killed. And we - make that YOU - did it. And we could do it again if we set our minds to the task.<br />
I certainly hope so - because there isn't anyone on earth I admire more than a HEMS flight-team. We are blessed to have people who walk out to a helicopter at 3am and launch into a night sky to help others. We should do everything possible to ensure their success.<br />
<br />
I wish <b><i>you </i></b>every success and hope you will check out my columns in Vertical 911. If there is something you want to talk about or want me to write about, let me or Elan know. She is my editor and counselor and coach. Meeting her made this all better.<br />
<br />
Best wishes for 2018 and beyond<br />
<br />
Dan<br />
<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHAHbBJ_prcaFXEnlHb_Z7zJBNheXM3hkPCq7o2d_4Y_CPzH0T6VWgP8KzpitiyN-jhg5gCWPaCBczKPDEhGRTeuxyQRnTwp-Vp_BuwdZSDe7DgUUQe6XIJR34uF0lF8vmyQyRSvOS23s/s1600/dan_and_don_bk.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="602" data-original-width="720" height="333" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHAHbBJ_prcaFXEnlHb_Z7zJBNheXM3hkPCq7o2d_4Y_CPzH0T6VWgP8KzpitiyN-jhg5gCWPaCBczKPDEhGRTeuxyQRnTwp-Vp_BuwdZSDe7DgUUQe6XIJR34uF0lF8vmyQyRSvOS23s/s400/dan_and_don_bk.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">In "Ejection Decision" I wrote about a flight with Jill and Don. That's Don<br />
on the right. Fast with a tube and fun to fly with...</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5386371994151518498.post-91318774188960065702017-11-01T11:04:00.000-07:002017-11-01T11:08:28.037-07:00Baby It's Cold Outside... <i><b>Crash review: two on the same day, two for the same reason...</b></i><br />
<i><b><br /></b></i>
<i><b>Read. Do not repeat...</b></i><br />
<br />
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA121<br />
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation<br />
Accident occurred Wednesday, January 02, 2013 in Seminole, OK<br />
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/08/2014<br />
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER EC130 B4, registration: N334AM<br />
Injuries: 4 Serious.<br />
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.<br />
<br />
The pilot reported hearing a sound like something had struck the helicopter shortly after departure while about 1,600 to 1,700 feet mean sea level. The engine lost power, and the pilot performed an autorotation to a field. While maneuvering to land, he saw a barbed wire fence obstructing the intended landing area, so he maneuvered the helicopter to clear the fence. The helicopter subsequently cleared the fence and landed hard in a field.<br />
Engine examination revealed that the four axial compressor blades exhibited significant deformation on the outboard tips of their leading edges in the direction opposite of normal rotation consistent with the ingestion of soft body foreign object debris, such as ice. A subsequent engine run did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. For 3 days before the accident flight, the helicopter was parked outside without its engine cover installed and was exposed to light drizzle, rain, mist, and fog. The engine inlet cover was installed the day before the accident at an unknown time. The helicopter remained outside and exposed to freezing temperatures throughout the night until 2 hours before the flight. Although the helicopter was maintained in a ready status on the helipad and maintenance personnel performed daily preflight/airworthiness checks, the inlet to the first-stage of the axial compressor was not inspected to ensure that it was free of ice in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual. Based on the weather conditions that the helicopter was exposed to during the 3 days before the accident, it is likely that ice formed in the engine air inlet before the flight and that, when the pilot increased the engine power during takeoff, the accumulated ice separated from the inlet and was ingested by the engine and damaged the compressor blades.<br />
<br />
<br />
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:<br />
The loss of engine power due to ice ingestion. Contributing to the accident was maintenance personnel’s delayed decision to install the helicopter's engine inlet cover until after the engine had been exposed to moisture and freezing temperatures and their inadequate daily preflight/airworthiness checks, which did not detect the ice formation.<br />
<br />
_________________________________________________________________________________<br />
<br />
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA122<br />
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation<br />
Accident occurred Wednesday, January 02, 2013 in Clear Lake, IA<br />
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/12/2015<br />
Aircraft: BELL HELICOPTER 407, registration: N445MT<br />
Injuries: 3 Fatal.<br />
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.<br />
<br />
GPS tracking data revealed that, after departure, the helicopter proceeded westbound about 600 ft above ground level (agl), following a roadway. About 6 minutes after liftoff, when the helicopter was about 3/4 mile south of the accident site, it turned right and became established on a northerly course. The helicopter subsequently turned left and appeared to be on a southerly heading at the final data point. Shortly before beginning the left turn, the helicopter entered a climb, reached an altitude of about 1,800 ft agl, and then entered a descent that continued until impact. Weather observations from the nearest Automated Surface Observing System, located about 7 miles east of the accident site, indicated that the ceilings and visibility appeared to be adequate for nighttime helicopter operations and did not detect any freezing precipitation. Although an airmen’s meteorological information advisory for icing conditions was current for the route of flight, and several pilot reports of icing conditions had been filed, none of the reports were in the immediate vicinity of the intended route of flight. Witnesses and first responders reported mist, drizzle, and icy road conditions at the time of the accident. It is likely that the pilot inadvertently encountered localized icing conditions, which resulted in his subsequent in-flight loss of helicopter control. A postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions. The engine control unit recorded engine torque, engine overspeed, and rotor overspeed events; however, due to their timing and nature, the events were likely a result of damage that occurred during the impact sequence. Evidence also indicated that the cyclic centering, engine overspeed, and hydraulic system warning lights illuminated; it is also likely that their illumination was associated with the impact sequence. Further, the engine anti-ice status light was illuminated, which was consistent with the activation of the anti-ice system at some point during the accident flight.<br />
<br />
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:<br />
The pilot’s inadvertent encounter with localized icing conditions and his subsequent in-flight loss of helicopter control.<br />
<br />
________________________________________________________________________________<br />
<br />
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA174<br />
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation<br />
Accident occurred Friday, February 22, 2013 in Oklahoma City, OK<br />
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/14/2016<br />
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER AS 350 B2, registration: N917EM<br />
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious.<br />
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.<br />
<br />
The emergency medical services helicopter departed a hospital helipad in dark night visual flight rules conditions and proceeded on its mission. Satellite data showed that, after takeoff, the helicopter began a gradual climb toward its planned destination. The data stopped about 3 minutes and 30 seconds into the flight. No distress calls were heard from the pilot. Fixed video surveillance cameras located near the accident site showed the last few seconds of the helicopter descending toward the ground. The helicopter impacted a parking lot, and a postimpact fire occurred.<br />
Examination of the wreckage revealed that three of the engine’s first-stage axial compressor blades exhibited deformation consistent with soft body foreign object damage. The remainder of the engine and airframe exhibited no evidence of malfunction that would have contributed to an in-flight loss of engine power.<br />
The helicopter’s air intake design, which had been modified to accommodate a different engine than that originally supplied by the helicopter’s manufacturer, incorporated a blanking plate attached to the top side of the engine cowling that covered a portion of the air inlet screen. A gap in the area where the blanking plate and the screen overlapped made it possible, in certain meteorological conditions, for water or snow to pass through the screen, accumulate on the blanking plate, and freeze into ice. Ice accumulation in this area, if left undetected, could result in the ice detaching from the blanking plate and entering the engine during operation, causing soft body foreign object damage and a loss of engine power. Precipitation and outside temperatures ranging from 35 to 19 degrees F occurred during the 12-hour period preceding the accident. The combination of these meteorological conditions was conducive to the formation and accumulation of ice in the area between the air inlet screen and the blanking plate.<br />
Although the helicopter’s flight manual supplement for cold weather operations recommended installation of an air inlet cover after the last flight of the day, during the day and night before the flight, the helicopter was parked outside on the helipad without an air inlet cover installed. According to the helicopter’s mechanic, he inspected the helicopter on the afternoon before the flight and noted that some snow had accumulated on it. It is likely that the lack of an engine air inlet cover allowed precipitation to accumulate in the vicinity of the engine air intake.<br />
The helicopter’s flight manual cold weather operations supplement also contained instructions for the pilot to perform a visual and manual (tactile) inspection of the air intake duct up to the first-stage compressor for evidence of snow and ice. Furthermore, the manufacturer and the Federal Aviation Administration had previously released information notices regarding inflight loss of engine power due to snow or ice ingestion caused by inadequate inspection or removal of snow or ice from the engine air inlet. These notices recommended a thorough inspection in and around the engine inlet area in order to detect and remove any snow or ice accumulation before flight.<br />
The initial on-scene examination found no remnants of ice or snow on these components because exposure to the postcrash fire would have melted such evidence. Surveillance video of the helipad showed that most of the helipad lights were off at the time of the pilot’s preflight inspection immediately before the flight, making it difficult for him to detect any ice or snow accumulation in the area of the engine air intake. Thus, the ice accumulation between the air inlet screen and the blanking plate remained undetected, and shortly after takeoff, the ice detached from the blanking plate, slid into the air inlet, and was subsequently ingested by the engine, resulting in an in-flight loss of engine power.<br />
.<br />
<br />
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:<br />
The loss of engine power due to engine ice ingestion during initial climb after takeoff in dark night light conditions. Contributing to the accident were the lack of an installed engine air inlet cover while the helicopter was parked outside, exposed to precipitation and freezing temperatures before the accident, and the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection that failed to detect ice accumulation in the area of the air inlet.Dan Fouldshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00967225641362222953noreply@blogger.com1